United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law 
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Supreme Court Case Files Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers 
10-1979 
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians 
Lewis F. Powell Jr. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Property Law 
and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 71. Powell Papers. 
Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia. 
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at 
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme 
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly 





December 7, 1979 Conference 




Cert. to U. S. Ct of CJ.aims 
(Friedman, Cowen, Davis; Nichols, 
concurs; Ben~P.t~, Kunzig, dissent) 
SIOUX NATIONS Federal/Civil Timely 
SUM!'i~RY: The SG puts the question t.his way: Whether 
legislation which divests an Indian tribe of a portion of its 
Jand in consideration of an undertaking to provide material 
assistance and food rations as long as needed amounts to a 
" taking" under the Fifth Amendment so as to entitle the tribe 




FACTS: In 1868 the United States and the Sioux Indians ---
signed a treaty establishing "for the absolute and undisturbed 
use and occupation of the Indians" certain land in South 
Dakota, incJuding 7 million acres in the Black Hills. That 
treaty provided that no cession of the reservations lands 
"shall be of an validity or force" unless executed and signed 
by at least three-fourths of the adult ma].e Indians occupying 
the lands. 
In 1874, an expedition led by then Lt. Col Custer 
~
discovered gold in the Black Hills. Thereafter, a large number 
of prospectors and settlers entered the reservation area 
without the consent of the Sioux. After a period of 
hostilities, including Custer's loss at Little Big Horn, 
President Grant appointed a commjssion to negotiate with the 
Sioux for the cession of the Black HilJ.s land. In 1876 the 
Commission negotiated an agreement with the Sioux chiefs 
-----------~---------------pursuant to which the Sioux ceded the Black Hills portion of 
the reservation and the United States, in return, agreed to 
~
provide the Sioux with specified rations ''until the Indians are 
able to support themselves." Less than 10% of the adult male 
Sioux approved that agreement. In 1877, Congress resolved the 
impasse by enacting into law the unratified agreement. 19 Stat. 
254. The United States reports that it has spent approxjmately 
$43 million on rations for the Sioux under the 1877 Act. 
) rnc§ the Sioux brought suit contending that the removal 
of the Black Hills from the Sioux Reservation constituted a 
Fifth Amendment "taking." The Court of CJaims rejected that 
- 3 -
content.ion holding that under the doctrine of ~on~~<2_:!_f_~ 
!!itchcoc~, 187 u.s. 553 (1903), no taking had occurred. Sioux 
.'!:.fl. be Y-..:.....JLn j t e ~-_§_tate s , 9 7 C t . C J.. 61 3 (J 9 4 2 ) c e r t . den i e d 3 J 8 
u.s. 789 (1943). 
In 1946, following the enactment of the Indian Clajms 
Commission Act of 1956, a second . round of litigation commenced. 
(That Act distinguishes between claims grounded on a taking of 
Indian reservation land, for which a Tribe can recover 
compensation with interest, and claims grounded on transactions 
marked by fraud, duress, mistake or "unconscionable 
consideration," for wh.ich compensation without interest will be 
paid~ See 25 u.s.c. § 70(a). In 1974, the Indians Claims 
ll " 
Commission determined that the 1877 Act did amount to a taking - - ----
and awarded the Sioux $17 million with interest at 5% per annum - .........,. __ since· 1877. 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 15J. (The interest now totals 
about $105 million.) On appeal, the Court of Claims reversed 
in part. It found that the taking claim was barred by 
principles of re .§._i~di_Qat~~ but it concluded that inadequate 
consideration had been paid for the BJ.ack Hills land and that 
the Sioux were therefore entitled to recover the principal 
amount of the award, but without interest. United States v. 
S:iou~, 518 F. 2d 1298 (Ct. Cl.) cert. denied 423 u.s. 1016 
(1975). 
The litigation would have ended there, except that in 1978 
Congress amended the Indian Claims Commission Act to direct the 
Court of Claims to reach the merits of the 1974 Commission 





of Claims did as directed and held that the 1877 Act had 
effected a taking. The SG asks this Court to review that 
decision. 
HOLQING_~ELQ~: Chief Judge Friedman's pJuraJ:ity opin5.on 
opined that the test for determining whether the 1877 Act 
effected a taking was whether Congress had made "a good faith 
effort to give the Indians the full value of the land." !b.r~~ 
Affi.liated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United 
Sta1~~, 390 F. 2d 686, 691 (1968). In adopting this test, he 
rejected the Government's rel.iance on ~Qne WQ1_f, ~UE~~' where 
this Court wrote that whenever the operative statute "purports 
to give an adequate consideration" for the lands appropriated, 
"the courts must presume that Congress acted in perfect good 
faith *** exercising its best judgment" in effecting "a mere 
change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property." 
187 U.S. at 568. Judge Friedman noted that Lone Wolf was an 
action for injunctive relief and not for damages, and read the 
case as holding merely that the judiciary should not enjoin the 
Congress from appropriating Indian land. He cited United 
post-~one ~<.2.lf case whi.ch teaches that the amount given in 
consideration can be considered in determining whether just 
compensation has been paid. Judge Friedman then reviewed the 
legislative history and applied his "good faith" test" 
The terms upon which Congress acquired the Black HiJJs 
were not the product of any meaningful arms-length 




judgment by Congress that it was paying a fair price. In 
the "negot5ations" the United States gave the Indians the 
Hobson's choice of ceding the Black Hills or starving. Not 
surprisingly, the Sioux Chiefs chose the former rather than 
the latter. 
*** 
There is no indication that Congress believed that or 
even considered whether the obligation it assumed to 
furnish the Sioux with rations until they could support 
themswelves constituted the fair equivalent of the value of 
the lands the United States was acquiring from them. 
*** 
There is no reason to believe that Congress antic5pated 
(1) that it would be required to continue to supply rations 
for mor e than a half-century or (2) that its fulfilJ .rnent of 
the obligation to feed the Sioux would entail the large 
expenditures it ultimately made. 
He concJuded that Congress had not acted in good faith and that 
the 1877 Act therefore was a taking. 
Judge Nichols concurred, but disagreed with the majority on 
the reading of Lo!!~Jiolf. For him that case was "a precedent 
fully applicabJe in a suit for just compensation as in 
injunction suit." Ho,.;ever, he read Lo~~o.:!J. as establishing a 
"good faith" test identical to that adopted in FoE__!:._Ber!:_hold. 
Judge Bennett, joined by Judge Nichols, dissented on the 
ground that Lone Wolf gives Congress the power to dispose of 
tribal. property without regard to good faith or the amount of 
compensation: "once Congress has disposed of [Indian] 
property, and has given value to the Indians for it, that is 
the end of the matter" under the Fifth Amendment. 
CON!~~!IONS: The SG, challenging on1y the award of 
.............. 
interest, puts forward four reasons for granting certiorari: -
1. The Court below has giving the precedent of ~on~~olf an 
\ 
* artifica11y narrow reading. 
- 6 -
2. Even if Lone WoJf is inapplicable, the decision below is 
wrong. The SG characterizes the decision as "attributing bad· 
faith to Congress simply because it failed to expressly say 
that it was giving fair value for the lands appropriated 
albeit it never suggested that it was not so doing, and, as it 
turned out, was in fact overgenerous." He asserts that this 
Court has concluded that there has been a Fifth Amendment 
taking of Indian lands only in instances in which no payment or 
NatiQ~, 295 u.s. 103 (1935) ~ .§_hos~Q!:!e T!__i~~~_:.._Qn5!:~2._.§_tates, 
299 u.s. 476 (1937) ~ Klamath & Moadoc Tribes, supra. 
3. The decision below undermines the Indian CJ.aims 
Commission Act which, according to the SG, "presumably 
contemplated" that most claims would fall into the category of 
cases involving inadequate consideration as to which value but 
*Lone-Wolf v1as an action to enjoin the Secretaryofinted.or-
from alloting and selling tribal land under a J900 statute on 
the ground that the J.aw was unconstitutional. The Indians 
there contended that Congress was without right to divest them 
of title to reservation land without complying with a treaty 
provision which required approval of three-quarters of the male 
tribe members for any changes. This Court held that Congress 
had power to break the treaty unilaterally. · As Judge Friedman 
noted the United States was not a party in Lone Wolf and had 
not consented to suit~ no court in 1903 ha~ jurisdiction to 
hear and determine Indian tribal claims, including taking 
claims. He therefore concJuded that Lone Wolf turned upon 
Congressional power to act, and not upon what ultimately might 
flow from the disputed action in the way of monetary relief. 
The SG contends that since the Indians had no remedy at law the 
Lone Wolf court had to hold that the challenged statute worked 
no-tai<Tng, otherwise under settled equitable principles an 




not interest would be paid. It denies prior claimants equal 
treatment because to date successful claims based on inadequate 
consideration have been awarded without interest. 
4. The sum involved is substantial, and the mode of 
analysis employed by the court below will affect "at least a 
dozen cases sti11 pending in the ·court of Claims." 
RESPONDEJ;i1:~-~.HI~F: The respondents champion Judge 
Friedman's narrow reading of Lone Wolf. They would go further 
than the Court of Claims and hold that Indians, l.ike all other 
persons, are entitled to just compensation whenever property is 
taken for any amount less than market value. However, they are 
satisfied with the "good faith test" in this case and argue 
that if it is the proper test, the question is fact-bound and 
does not merit review here. Respondents a1so contend t9at the 
SG's claim that the decision below will impact upon pending 
cases is without foundation~ they assert that there are no such 
pending cases or at least none that they are aware of. 
Finally, respondents contend that application of the Lone WC?.lf 
test would deny them equal protection of the law. 
DISCUSSION: The SG seems correct in his assertion that the 
decisions of this Court finding a taking involve instances in 
which no payment was made or inadequate payment after the fact 
was made. This Court simply has not had occasion to determine 
~ whether a~qui si tion of Indian J and for pr~ent but inadequate 
\ compensat1on constitutes a taking. Nor has the Court had 




-Wolf aecisjon. Thus, the case seems certworthy. If the Court, 
,.._ __ ----~---, 
however, is prepared to adopt a standard simil_ar to that 
employed by the majority below, the prospect of wading through 
a volumjnous record to determine good fajth might counsel a 
denial. 
There is a response. 
11/27/79 Shechtman opn. in petn. 
\ 
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.... ~.~Lc ~) 
Question Presented: ~~ .yr :1 
f.o ~ Ci('" _ ~ -r-cAf '7 r~Ss-:J,.tUrO 
~~~. 
Whether l~iGt ~~ibe of a 
po~o~7j\~~.;~ e.tur~~k~ro~~ 
assi~tan~e~~~~rat ions ~ong ~ needed am9UntS t~a 'taking' 
~ , ' \.1-- l4.t..-~ LA-
under the Fifth erl9,ent~~ as to ent~he tri ~ to interest on a 
~ r(A..(__ -~-...~~ . 7k-t_YrJ?.b-~ 
later ard for the value of t~~~' 
L-t.:- ~~4?~ ~6-~~ 
~Uu._~~~ ~~a~,., 
Ba!kground ~ ~ ~ 4 
~ 7t!JtJ1 oDtJ 4~.•.£.,_ "1 ~~ 
The actual background of this case is simply too long and 
convoluted to run through in this memo. The salient points to me 
are: "- ·~,eia~ ~ ~~ ~ 
~~ ~~4#~--c_.,Qt!~~ 
1) In 1868 the United States and t~e Sioux Nation signed a 
1./L ~' 
treaty. Under the treaty, the Sioux received complete control over a 
large territory, including the more than 7 million acres of the Black 
~
Hills at issue in this case. The 1868 agreement also required the 
2. 
Government to provide rations for the Indians for four years. 
-----------~ -
Finally, no additional cession of Sioux lands was to be accomplished 
unless executed and signed by three-fourths of the adult male Indians 
in the tribe. 
2) After gold was discovered in the Black Hills, the 
pressures to occupy the land with whites became irresistable. The 
Government carne to a thoroughly rational decision to acquirethe land 
from the Sioux. Since no one could keep the prospectors out of the 
vast expanse of the Black Hills, that decision made sense both for 
Washington and for the Sioux. The Government commissioned a survey 
of the land to determine its worth, and the official statements of 
this period -- about 1875 -- are full of intent to provide full value 
for the lands. ---3) The Allison Commission in 1875 attempted to negotiate 
the purchase of the lands. The Commission offered $6 million. The 
I 
Indians asked for $70 million. The negotiations collapsed. , (From 
here on, my narrative may seem a bit partisan, but it reflects my 
understanding and interpretation of the facts.) 
4) Washington seems to have changed its policies to attempt 
to coerce the Sioux into reaching a settlement. It directed the Army 
to stop trying to keep white prospectors out of the Black Hills, and 
Congress in 1876 directed that all subsistence rations to the Sioux 
-----------~------------'-----------------------------------be cut off within a year. Those rations kept the tribe alive, or at 
least kept alive the 30,000 who lived peacefully on the reservations 
(another 3,000 or so, including Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, lived --- ,.. 
off the reservation and fed themselves). These subsistence rations 
were not mandated by 1868 treaty, since that only covered four years. 
3. 
Yet it should be remembered that the Sioux were Plains Indians who 
lived off the buffalo herds. The disappearance of the herds and the 
restriction of the Sioux to their reservations eliminated their 
traditional means of self-support. 
5) War broke out in 1876, and Custer made his last stand. 
All Sioux who wanted to live on the reservations were disarmed and 
their horses were taken away. This entirely deprived them of any 
ability to support themselves. 
6) In the fall of 1876, a treaty was negotiated with the 
chiefs of the tribe. In return for the 7 million acres, the 
Government: (a) agreed to provide the Sioux with "all necessary aid 
to assist the said Indians in the work of civilization"; (b) agreed 
to furnish them -with schools; and (c) agreed to supply specified 
rations to all working adult Sioux and children in schools "until the 
Indians are able to support themselves." As the Court of Claims 
pointed out, the first two items had already been granted to the 
Sioux under the 1868 treaty. 
7) Less than 10 per cent of the adult male Sioux signed the 
treaty. Nevertheless, Congress enacted its provisions into law in 
1 ~ 7 ·.., 
8) Through labrynthine wrangling in Congress and the 
courts, this case after 45 years has now been reduced to a dispute 
over interest. Both sides agree that the Government owed the Sioux 
\..... ___... -
$17 million for the Black Hills. Although the Government claims to 
have spent $43 million for support of the Sioux over the years, 
Congress has directed that those funds should not be set off against 
-
any award due to the Sioux. The question in this case is whether the 
4. 
Government "took" the Black Hills within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment, and thus must be held to provide just compensation. If 
there was such a taking, the Government also owes the Indians over 
$100 million in interest (at current interest rates, that's not too 
bad! ) • 
Discussion: 
The legal questions in this case are peculiar to Indian law. 
~irss , there is the problem of the impact of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 
187 U.S. 553 (1903), where this Court suggested that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review a congressional determination of what is a 
fair deal with Indians. The Lone Wolf holding was that such 
determinations are in the nature of political questions. It has been 
r~ud~te~ by this Court in Delaware Tribal Business Comm'n v. Weeks, 
430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977), and should not be applied to this case. 
Second, there is the question of what Jlstandard of review 
should be applied to the bargain struck by Congress with the Sioux. 
In Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. United 
States, 390 F.2d 686 
<~~good faith effort" 
(Ct. Cl. 1 968) , the Court of Claims adopted a 
/ ~ - -----------------standard. Under this criterion, so long as 
Congress made a good faith effort to strike a fair deal with the 
Indians, the courts should not review the equity of the transaction. 
This standard has never been reviewed by this Court. I think it a 
------~ .... -----...-..- - - -
highly dubious test. It retains much of Lone Wolf's deference to 
~
congressional conduct of Indian affairs, while also demonstrating 
little concern for the rights of Indians. In no other context may 
5. 
Congress unilaterally set the price for condemned land. In all other 
circumstances, the courts value the property. Monongahela Navigation 
Co. v. United States, 148 u.s. 312 (1893). 
I see no compelling reason to adopt a different posture in 
this case, especially in light of the unusual relationship between 
the Indians and the Government. Indeed, I would view~rt Berthold 
/' 
as a departure from this Court's traditional position in Shoshone 
Tribe v. United States, 299 u.s. 476 (1937), and in Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion in ~rokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 u.s. (1831). 
In both of those decisions, this Court ruled that the Government must 
pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment for any property 
" ~----------------,~------------------------------------taken from Indian tribes. The SG suggests that because Congress is 
trustee for the Indians this Court should utilize a lesser standard 
of review for congressional actions that must be taken in the 
interests of the Indians. But here the Congress clearly sought to 
protect interests other than the Indians'. In most cases, Congress 
must guard both the public interest and the Indians' interest. This 
conflict of loyalties suggests that the need for judicial review of 
compensation is even sharper in takings of Indian land. 
Thus, I would apply the Fifth Amendment taking clause 
~-----------------------------------directly to this transaction. This result would require the payment 
this case. It would be possible to reach the same 
superficially incorrect because the SG continues to chant that the 
l 
6. 
Government spent $43 million supporting the Sioux, even though 
respondent argues persuasively (to me) that the eventual cost of the 
subsistence payments should not be taken as dispositive of the equity 
of the original deal. Moreover, I think the "good faith effort" 
approach is simply not justified under the Fifth Amendment. Because 
the treaty was never accepted by the Sioux, the Government took the 





TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: David 
DATE: March 21, 1980 
RE: No. 79-639, United States v. Sioux Nation 
The sG•s reply brief opposes any abandonment of this Court•s 
previously deferential approach to congressional arrangements with c:.-----'--------· ----------
Indian tribes. The SG suggests briefly that such a course would 
convert "every valid exercise" of Congress• "plenary power to manage 
tribal lands for the benefit of the tribe" into a "taking" under the 
Fifth Amendment. Although the SG does not really press the point, 
the claim does focus on what I see as the major danger in the course 
I recommended in the main bench memo: That unforeseen and 




way to limit that prospect would be to restrict the 
this case t~ts -- a e tutoii: t :_king of ~ 
the SG 1 s argument concerns the management of Indian 
assets, an issue that arises more frequently than simply the seizure 
of land. In addition, I suspect that if the prospect of crushing 
future 1 iabil i ty were real, the SG would be screaming a bit louder 
about it. The muted tones of his reply brief suggests to me that the 
2. 
course I initially recommended is not likely to involve unacceptable 
costs to the Government. 
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SUPP~EMENTA~ - MEM0RANBUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: David 
DATE: March 25, 1980 
RE: No. 79-639, Bnited -States - v; - Sioox -Nation 
The $17 million base figure for the Black Hills was set by 
the Indian Claims Commission in 1974. Sioox -Nation - v; - United · States, 
33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 151, 362-363 (1974). The Court of Claims affirmed 
that award. Bnited - States - v; - Sioox - Nation, 518 F.2d 1298 (Ct. Cl. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 u.s. 1016. Thus, the valuation of the land 
is no longer a live issue in this litigation. 
----. : 
~·g-1 
Mr. Justice Marshall~ 
.. 
Mr. Justice · Blackrnun~ 
~~~~-k-~-~ 
~!-~ f>Jt,W . .. . 
. . 
.... · . ... 
He. Justicq:.e;~~.__,_~...___~ 
~ ~4~ ~ HA · • .......,~~. 
~ 9 ~ ~..,cL4v ~~ ~~­
&--<_ 9 d--~~~ 
4 ·=ts d(,...,..r-:$ ~· n-4-.u. ~~ . 
~ee·f· '"' ~r~ -~ ~. v~A:.~~,to d.;)~444f~ 
.. 1"2-<... 1)'1-~~4 .,J_ ~1-d ~4A~ 
t9-f~~~ ~~~,,~,J~ 





· Mr. Justice Stevens·-~ . 
I I 
~~ ~ UAw AA.4.~ ~:c-4.-.f 4 
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~~~AAA.-«~~~~~ 
c.I-~~:P, w~~ V'ltA-t ~ 
~-~q~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
~ttpuuu Qfcmi trf t~t ~t~ ~tat.eg 
~ltf.llfi:ttgtott, gl. Qf. 20,?~j 
..JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
April 7, 1980 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States 
79-639 
Because my mention of the possibility that some 
of our earlier cases would strongly indicate that the 
congressional directive to re-hear this case in the 
Court of Claims without regard to the defense of res 
judicata could run afoul of the limitations placed on 
Article III courts , I have done some further looking 
into the matter . I must confess that one of the closest 
cases in point I found was one which Harry suggested to 
me , United States v. Klein, 13 Wall . 128 (1872). As 
with so many other areas of the law, there are cases going 
both ways, but I am tentatively convinced that the Klein 
rationale is persuasive. Since this would represent a 
dissenting view, requiring vacation of the decision of 
the Court of Claims, and since the Chief has already assigned 
the case for preparation of a majority opinion affirming 
the Court of Claims, in the interest of orderly procedure 
I shall simply circulate a dissent along the above mentioned 
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79-639 u. s. v. Sioux Nation ' 




' .r. ... ~ .. 
. ,,ll• ,.;. 
Bill Rehnquist's memorandum of April 7 prompts me 
to say that although my vote at Conference - and now - is to 
affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims, I have never 
considered carefully the suggestion that Congress exceeded 
its lawful authority in directing the Court of Claims to 
disregard the defense of res judicata. 
~~ 
I must say, however, that in light of the case 
Harry brought to our attention (United States v. Klein, 13 
Wall. 128), the point is not frivolous. I therefore have 
some uneasiness about our decision. Quite apart from the 
large sum of money involved in this particular case, I have 
wondered whether our decision will establish a precedent that 
will give rise to similar claims from Indian tribes that -
over the past century or more - may have been persuaded or 
coerced to surrender lands under circumstances that now would 
be viewed as a "taking". 
In sum, if Rill Rehnquist's further study indicates 
that there is indeed a substantial constitutional auestion as 
to congressional power, I could vote for a reargument on this 
issue. I appreciate that the possibility of reargument was 
suagested at Conference, and there appeared to be 
insufficient interest in reargument to delay the assignment 
of the writing of an oPinion on the merits. I write now 
merely to express the above qualification to my otherwise 
positive vote to affirm. 
l' '· ss 
of f 









JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~ttpnmt Qj'aurl.cf tip~ ~tribb ~ht!tg · 
~NSfri:ttgtmt, ~. C!J. 2.0gt>1~ 
April 11, 1980 
Re: No. 79-639 United States v. Sioux Nation 
Dear Harry: 
Since a number of us seem to be bombarding one another 
with memoranda in this case, I take the liberty of 
responding to your memorandum of April 11, to make just a 
few preliminary points in response. United States v. 
Klein is unquestionably distinguishable from the 
congressional action taken in this case on several 
grounds, two of which you mention in your memorandum. 
Nevertheless, one of the underlying principles of the 
Klein decision was that finality is an essential component 
of Art. III decisions and that Congress may not interfere 
with the exercise of judicial power by stripping a 
judgment of its finality. I believe that this premise of 
Klein has survived and may have applicability to this case. 
This Court in Pope v. United States, 323 u.s. 1 
(1944), another case which you cite, found that the 
decision in Klein "rested upon the ground that • • • 
Congress was without constitutional authority to control 
the exercise of ••• judicial power ••• by requiring 
this Court to set aside the judgment of the Court of 
Claims." Id. at 8. The Court in Pope found that the 
congressional act in issue there did not conflict with 
Klein because properly construed, it did not "set aside [a 
prior] judgment or ••• require a new trial of the issues 
• which the court had resolved against petitioner." 
The Court specifically found that because Congress had not · 
set aside a final judgment of an Art. III court, the Act 
did not "encroach upon the judicial function which the 
Court of Claims had previously exercised." The Court was 
careful to reserve the question of whe~her there would be 
unconstitutional encroachment upon that function if 
Congress had set aside the prior judgment of the Court of 
- 2 -
Claims and ordered a new trial (as opposed to forming a 
new statutory obligation). The Court stated: 
"We do not consider jus t what application 
the principles announced in the Klein case 
could rightly be given to a case in which 
Congress sought, pendente lite, to set aside 
a judgment of the Court of Claims in favor 
of the government and to require 
relitigation of this suit. For we do not 
construe the [Act] as r equiring the Court of 
Claims to set aside the judgment in the case 
already decided or as changing the rules of 
decision for the determination of a pending 
case." (Emphasis added.) · 
Thus Pope reserves the very question which you state 
was decided by Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 U.S. 
476 almost twenty years earlier. While I was aware of the 
Cherokee Nation case, I am not satisfied that it should be 
found controlling in this situation. In Cherokee, the 
Court found that Congress passed a statute permitting 
relitigation so that the Cherokees could present a theory 
that they were entitled to interest on a compounded basis, 
rather than merely the simple interest which they were 
awarded in a prior Court of Claims decision. The Court in 
the Cherokee case states that the theory of computing 
interest which the Cherokees were asserting in the second 
action was not "presented either to the Court of Claims or 
to this Court. It is a new argument not before 
considered." 270 U.S. at 486. Thus Cherokee did not 
present the precise issue of whether Congress can require 
an Art. III Court to adjudicate the identical issue more 
than one time. 
I am not convinced that Congress has done no more than 
assert a litigant's waiver in this case. Congress in fact 
has required the Court of Claims to adjudicate an issue 
which it has already adjudicated. While other litigants 
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may also be able to waive res judicata, I do not think 
that a court would feel obligated to exercise its 
jurisdiction under such circumstances. Thus I think the 
congressional action in this case is more appropriately 
characterized as a congressional grant of a new trial on 
an issue which has been finally decided. I am not ready 
to conclude that simply on the authority of Cherokee 
Nation there is no invasion of judicial powers when 
Congress declines to respect the firyality of this Court's 
decisions, sets aside a valid judgment, and orders a new 
trial on an issue previously decided in an Article III 
Court. If we were to enter a judgment in favor of the 
United States in this case, could Congress order the Court 
of Claims to hear the issue once again? Under your 
reading of Cherokee Nation, I think the answer to that 
question would have to be yes. 
I had not intended to articulate my position in this 
case as of yet, since it is still in the formative stages, 
but I did want to express my view that the question should 
be viewed as quite substantial despite the decision in 
Cherokee Nation. If the Court in Klein was right that 
Congress does not have the power to set aside a final 
judgment of an Art. III Court, then I think this case may 
well be governed by Klein. I think the Court in PoEe 
wisely reserved the question presented in this case and I 
think we should give it the consideration it deserves. 
Sincerely, 
~~~ 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBI!:RS OP' 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.Snvrtm.t Qlomt ltf t4t ~ttitth .imtts 
._asJtittgt:cn. ~. Ql. 2ll.;t_,.~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation 
April 11, 1980 
Bill Rehnquist's memorandum of April 7, and Lewis' memo-
randum of April 10, prompt me to set forth my present views 
on the question whether Congress had the constitutional power 
to enact legislation requiring the Court of Claims to reach 
the merits of the Sioux' taking claim. 
As I indicated at Conference, I believe that United States 
· v. Klein, a case I brought up, is properly distinguishable 
from this case, principally on two. grounds. First, the case 
traditionally has been read as a limitation on Congress' 
power to dictate how evidence in a particular case is to be 
judged, when that power also interferes with the consti tu-
tional authority committed to a co-equal branch -- in Klein, 
Congress attempted to render the President's pardon power a 
nullity. No such problem is presented in this case. See 
Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 
315-316 (2d ed. 1973). Second, in Klein, the legislation 
which Congress enacted had the effect of retroactively clos-
ing the doors of the Court of Claims to a party who already 
had been adjudged to have a legitimate claim against the 
United States. Here, of course, Congress' legislative action 
had the effect of giving a claimant against the Government a 
second chance to establish its claim. Arguably, legislative 
action by which Congress waives its right to a judgment in 
its favor does not present the same kind of equitable con-
cerns that were presented in Klein. 
Moreover, since Conference I have had the occasion to 
look into this issue a bit more closely. For the present, I 
am convinced that the later case of Cherokee Nation v. United 
States, 270 u.S. 4 76 ( 1926) , is controlling on the question. 
The facts of that case reveal that the Cherokee had obtained 
a judgment against the u.s., affirmed by this Court in Ap~il, 
1906, which judgment included a large amount of interest. 
Thereafter, in 1919, Congress passed a special act that gave 
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jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear and determine the 
claim of the Cherokee against the u.s. for additional 
interest arising out of the same substantive claim. This 
Court .observed that "but for the special act of 1919 • 
the question here mooted would have been foreclosed as res 
judicata." Id., at 486. "The Court construed the special 
act as a waiver · of the res judicata effect of the prior 
j~dgment, and concluded: "The power of Congress to waive such 
an adjudication is clear." Ibid. See also Pope v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 1, 8-10 (discussing, inter alia, Klein and 
Cherokee Nation). ----
I, of course, shall be interested in what Bill Rehnquist 
may come up with. For now, however, I am fairly persuaded 
that there is no need for reargument since our prior cases 
establish the authority of Congress to waive the res judicata 
effects of a prior judgment in the Government's favor. 
In response to Lewis' concern that this case may estab-
lish a precedent that will enable Indian tribes to raise 
similar claims based on "takings" of . a century ago, I have 
only a brief observation. Does not the five year statute of 
limitations for claims existing before August 13, 1946, 
established in 25 U.S.C. § 70k, obviate that concern to a 
significant extent? 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.§ ttpr ntt r ~ Mtrt of tfy t 'Jllnit.d~ ~t 2i h· s 
~aslli.ngton. m. <q. 21l?J~:~ 
T HE CH I EF .JUSTICE Apr il 11 , 1980 
Re : 79-639 - United States v . Sioux Nation 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE : 
Tentatively, I lean to Harry's reading of 
Klein. It is one thing f or Congress to try to nullify 
a favorable judgment and not quite the same to "revive" 
a "dead" claim. It can always do the latter by private 
bills but historically it has used the Court of Claims 
as its "agent" to analyze the evidence relating to 
damages and even broader questions which a committee 
of Congress is not equipped to deal with. 
For the moment, I am content to wait for the 
opinion and perhaps that will resolve doubt~ 
Regards, 
C HAMBE RS OF" 
~u:prtmt Q}ltUrlcf flrt ~tb ~taftg , 
jtlW!p:n:g~ ~. Q}. wp:~~ 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
April 14, 1980 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation 
I fully agree with Harry's most recent memorandum 
in this case dated April 14th, and especially with his 
observation that the case should not be set for reargument. 
After all, the Solicitor General is obligated to defend an 
Act of Congress, and setting it for reargument would 
place the government in the very awkward position of 
asserting the Act's unconstitutionality, or of giving 




.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~uprtntt ~ourl d t!rt ~ttittb htttg 
~ultingbm. ~~ <q. 2ll.;t~~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
April 
Re: No. 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation 
The recent correspondence prompts me to circulate this 
memorandum. The case has been assigned to me for an 
op1n1on. I have no desire to undertake that substantial 
task (I trust you all will agree it is rather substantial 
if the merits are to be reached) , if there is a fair 
likelihood that a majority ultimately will conclude that 
Congress exceeded its authority. 
I think it desirable, therefore, that we focus on that 
issue and count the votes. If a majority feel the way Bill 
Rehnquist does, the case should be reassigned. If a 
majority feel otherwise, at least tentatively, I shall be 
willing to go ahead. 
As of now, I would reach the merits. The recent cor-
respondence indicates that the Chief feels that way; that 
Bill Rehnquist is of the other view; and that Lewis is 
perhaps inclined in the other direction. I shall do 
nothing until the dust settles. 
I might add as a postscript, that I am not very enthu-
siastic about setting the case for reargument. Although I 
think it unnecessary, I would not be opposed to requesting 
prompt briefing on this added issue if a majority is so 
inclined. There then would be a chance of getting the 
case down before the Summer. 
Sioux Nation 
Dear Harry: 
This is a reply to vour memorandum of April 
I supnose that rearqument woulrl, as Bill Rehnquist 
noted, place the qovernment is an awkward position. But I do 
not think Rill's point is frivolous, and certainly you are 
entirely riqht that we should make a decision on the 
rebriefinq or reargument without further delay. I would join 
four for a request for briefing on this sinqle issue. Absent 
such a vote, vou can count on mv remaininq with my Conference 
vote. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 




~ttpt"ttttt <!jttnrlltf tJrt ~tb .;§taitlt 
jir as lfinghm. ~. <!f. 2ll~~.:J 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
April 21, 1980 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation 
I think I appreciate the points both Harry and 
Lewis have made in their recent correspondence on this 
subject. Given the convoluted nature of the proceedings, 
I think the awkwardness of the position of the govern-
ment to which Lewis refers in his letter to Harry of 
April 18th is apparent~ I would, with Lewis, join for 
re-argument with the stipulation that an amicus be appointed 

















..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~tlttt ClJlturlltf tlrt ~~ j\hdtg 
'Jfu~ ~. Qf. 2ll&f'!~ 
April 21, 1980 
Re: No. 79-639, United States v. 
Sioux Nation 
Dear Harry, 
I am more than a little concerned about 
the impact of a decision that there was a 
"taking .. in this case, but I remain of the 
view that there was. Although the issue that 
interests Bill Rehnquist is not a ·frivolous 
one, it was not made an issue in this case, 
and I agree that no purpose would be served 
by setting the case for reargument on this 





Mr. Justice Blackmun 
' / 
Copies to the Conference 
Harry: 
I will await Bill Rehnquist's 
Article III issue before making a final 
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CHAMBERS O F" 
..JUSTICE W>< . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR . June 11 , 1980 
RE: No. 79-639 United States v. Sioux Nation 
Dear Harry: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
~~I 
_J ~ ~ u/;f/(' t 




~u:pr ttttt <!fa-u:rt cf tqt 2!Inittb ;§ttrlt.il' 
1fTa.s-ltingtcn, ~· <!f. 20gTJ!,~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 11, 1980 
Re: 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation 
of Indians 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.:§npuuu C!fomi of lltt ~dt .:§hrlt g 
:Wrur !pngicn, ~. <!}. 211gi't 2 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
June ll , 1980 
Re: 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation 
Dear Harry: 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
.§u.prtmt <Q:ourt of tlrt pni..ttb j,ta.tte 
Wasfrington. :ID. <q:. 20c5'1-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
Re: No. 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
DOS 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: David 
DATE: June 11, 1980 
RE: No. 79-639, United States v. Sioux Nation 
I have plowed through this endless tome with particular 
attention to the Article III arguments raised at Conference by 
Justice Rehnquist. Although HAB has produced a document only 
slightly shorter than the D.C. phone book, I do think his treatment 
of the Article III question was persuasive. Assuming that this Court 
does not go looking for confrontations with Congress over such 
matters, HAB presents good reasons to accept jurisdiction: 1) 
Congress acted under its powers to pay debts and, as sovereign, 
waived res judicata defenses that it might interpose; 2) the Klein 
case involved congressional usurpation of the constitutional power of 
the Executive to make pardons and of the judiciary insofar as 
Congress attempted to reverse the Court's construction of the 
constitutional effect of a pardon in Padleford; 3) Justice Cardozo's 
Cherokee Nation opinion appears to be squarely on point, holding that 
in an Indian treaty case Congress may waive its res judicata defense. 
I spoke to Justice Rehnquist' s clerk, who said that they 
still expect to dissent on the Article III issue. (Reportedly 
2. 
Justice Rehnquist suggested that the dissent be different from HAB's 
opinion "in every respect -- expecially length.") I think it would 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~ 
tt-f No. 79- 639 
United States, Petitioner, 
v. 
1'" 
Sioux Nation of Indians et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 6./t .5 
United States Court of j L.e ~ 
Claims. 
wll/(~~ 
[June - -, 1980] 
-~ H/J-~5-
MR. JusTICE BLACKMON delivered the opinion of the Court. ~,to 
This case concerns the Black Hills of South Dakota, the J1':t...t_ S ~ 
Great Sioux Reservation, and a colorful, and in many respects ~ , 
tragic, chapter in the history of the Nation's West. Although-ti  ~ 
the litigation comes down to a claim of interest since 1877 J...A.. , 
on an award of over $17 million, it is necessary, in order to 
understand the controversy, to review at some length the , , 
chronology of the case and its factual setting. 9 ~ ~ 
~~h..;;-1 • 
For over a century now the Sioux Nation has claimed tha~~ 
the United States unlawfully abrogated the Fort L!:lrami(-2-~ 
Treaty of April 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, in Art. II of which th~  .£...._ 
United States pledged that the Great Sioux Reservation, in-~~- .IJ 
eluding the Black Hills, would be "set apart for the absolutep ... _._... <i 
and undisturbed use and occupation of the Indians herein ~~ 
named." !d., at 636. The Fort Laramie Treaty was con- i2. t{. $' , tfJ b), f· 
eluded at the culmination of the Powder River War of 1866-..,.,- 6f ' 
1867, a series of military engagements in which the Sioux 
tribes, led by their great chief, Red Cloud, fought to protect 
the integrity of earrlef-recognized treaty lands from the in-
cursion of white settlers.1 
1 The Sioux territory recogized under the Treaty of September 17, 1851 , 
·ee 11 Stat. 749, included all of the present State o.f South Dakota, and 
parts of what is now Nebraska, Wyoming, North Dakota , and Montana . 
79- 639-0PINION 
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The For·t Laramie Treaty included several agreements cen-
tral to the issues presented in this case. First, it established 
the Great Sioux Reservation, a tract of land bounded on the 
east by the Missouri River, on the south by the northern 
border of the State of Nebraska, on the north by the forty-
sixth parallel of north latitude, and on the west by the one 
hundred and fourth meridian of west longitude,2 in addition 
to certain reservations already existing east of the Missouri. 
The United States "solemnly agree [ d]" that no unauthorized 
persons ashall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or 
reside in [this] terri tory." Ibid. 
Second, the United States permitted members of the Sioux 
tribes to select lands within the reservation for cultivation. 
T d., at 637. In order to assist the Sioux in becoming civilized 
farmers, the overnment romised to provide them with the 
necessary services an materials, and with subsistence rations 
for four years. I d., at 639.3 
The Powder River War is described in some detail in D. Robinson, A 
History of the Dakota or Sioux Indians, 356-381 ( 1904), reprinted in 2 
South Dakota Historical Collections (1904). Red Cloud's career as a 
warrior and statesman of the Sioux is rPcotmted in 2 G. Hebard & E. 
Brininstool, The Bozeman Trail, 175-204 (1922) . 
2 The b(•undaries of the reservation included approximately half the 
area of what is now the State of South Dakota, including all of that State 
west of the Missouri River save for a narrow strip in the far western 
portion. The reservation also included a narrow strip of land west of 
the Missouri and north of tbe border between North and Sduth Dakota. 
3 The treaty called for the construction of schools and the provision of 
teachers for the education of Indian children, tbe provision of seeds and 
agricultural instruments to be used in the first four years of planting, and 
the provision of blacksmiths, carpenters, millers, and engineers to per-
form work on the reservation. See 15 Stat . 637-638, 640. In addition,. 
the United States agreed to deliver certain articles of clothing to each 
Indian residing on the reservation, "on or before the first day of August 
of each year, for thirty years." !d., at 638. An annual stipend of $10 
per per~on was to be appropriated for all those members of the Sioux 
Nation who continued to engage in hunting; those who settled on the 
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Third, in exchange for the benefits conferred by the treaty, 
the Sioux agreed to relinquish their rights under the Treaty 
of September 17, 1851, to occupy territories outside the res-
ervation, while reserving their "right to hunt on any lands 
north of North Platte, and on the Republican Fork of the 
Smoky Hill river, so long as the buffalo may range thereon in 
such numbers as to justify the chase." Ibid. The Indians 
also expressly agreed to withdraw aU opposition to the build-
ing of railroads that did not pass over their reservation lands, 
110t to engage .in attacks on settlers, and to withdraw their 
opposition to the military posts and roads that had been 
established south of the North Platte River. Ibid. 
Fourth, Art. XII of the treaty provided: 
"No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the 
reservation herein described which may be held in com-
mon shall be of any validity or force as against the said 
Indians, unless executed and signed by at least three 
fourths of all the adult male Indians, occupying or in-
terested in the same." lbid.4 
The years following the treaty brought relative peace to 
the Dakotas, all era of tranquility that was disturbed, how-
ever, by renewed speculation that the Black Hills, which were 
included in the Great Sioux Reservation, contained vast quan-
tities of gold and silver." In 1874 the Army planned and 
rations of meat and flour (one pound of each per day) were to be pro-
vided for a period of four year:; to those Indians upon the reservation who 
could not provide for their own needs. !d., at 639. 
4 The Fort Laramie Treaty was considered by some commentators to 
have been a complete victory for Red Cloud and the Sioux. In 1904 it 
was described as "the only inst~nce in the history of the United States 
where the government has gone to war and afterwards negotiated a peace 
conceding everything demanded by the enemy and exacting nothmg in 
return." Robinson, supra, n. I, at. 387. 
5 The history of speculation concerning the presence of gold in the Black 
Hills, which dated from early explorations by prospectors in the 1830'1$h 
is cal?sulized in D . Jackson, Cu:;ter' · Gold 3-7 (1966). 
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undertook an exploratory expedition into the Hills, both for 
the purpose of establishing a military outpost from which to 
~<e~ Sioux who had not accepted the terms of 
'I th~F~-rt- La~~~~i~ Treaty, and for the purpose of investigating 
"the country about which dreamy stories have been told." 
D. Jackson, Custer's Gold 14 (1966) (quoting the 1873 an-
nual report of Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, as 
Commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, to the 
Secretary of War). Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong 
Custer led the expedition of close to 1,000 soldiers and team-
sters, and a substantial number of military and civilian .aides. 
Custer's journey began at Fort Abraham Lincoln on the Mis-
souri River on July 2, 1874. By the end of that month, they 
had reached the Black Hills, and by mid-August had con-
firmed the presence of gold fields in that region. The dis-
covery of gold was widely reported in newspapers across the 
country.« Custer's florid descriptions of the mineral and tim-
ber resources of the Black Hills, aud the land's suitability for 
grazing and cultivation, also received wide circulation, and 
had the effect of creating an intense popular demand for the 
"opening" of the Hills for settlement.7 The only obstacle to 
0 In 1974, the Center for Western Studies completed a project compiling 
contemporary newspaper accounts of Custer's expedition. See H. Krause 
& G. Olson, Prelude to Glory (1974). Several correspondents traveled 
with Custer on the expedition and their dispatches were published by 
newspapers both in the Midwest. and the East. ld., at 6. 
7 SeE~ Robin~on, supra n. 1, at 408-410; A. Tallent, The Black Hill1; 130 
{1975 reprint of 1899 ed .); J . Vaughn, The Reynolds Campaign on Pow-
der RiVl'r a-4 (1961). 
The Sioux regarded Custer's expedition in itself to be a violation of the 
Fort Laramie Treaty. In later negotiations for ceso;ion of the Black Hills, 
Cu:<ter '~ trail through the Hilb wa::; rPfPrrcd to hy a chief known ao> Fast 
Bear Hi; "that thievf>S' road ." Jarkson, 11upra n. 5, at 24. Chroniclel'b 
of the exprd1ticn, at least to an extent, have agreed. See id ., at 120; 
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"progress" was the Fort Laramie Treaty that reserved occu-
pancy of the Hills to the Sioux. 
Having promised the Sioux that the Black Hills were re-
served to them, the United States Army was placed in the 
position of having to threaten military force, and occasionally 
to use it, to prevent prospectors and settlers from trespassing 
on lands reserved to the Indians. For example, in Septem-
ber 1874, General Sheridan sent instructions to Brigadier Gen-
eral Alfred H. Terry, Commander of the Department of 
Dakota, at Saint Paul, directing him to use force to prevent 
companies of prospectors from trespassing on the Sioux res-
ervation. At the same time, Sheridan let it be known that 
he would "give a cordial support to the settlement of the 
Black Hills," should Congress decide to "open up the country 
for settlement, by extinguishing the treaty rights of the 
Indians." App. 62-63. Sheridan's instructions were pub-
'lished in local newspapers. See id., at 63.8 
Eventually, however, the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment decided to abandon t~ treaty obligation to 
preserve the integrity of e wux tern ory. n a letter 
dated November 9, 1875, to Terry, Sheridan reported that he 
had met with President Grant, the Secretary of the Interior, 
8 General William Tecumseh Sherman, Commanding General of the 
Army, as quoted in the Saint Louis Globe in 1875, described tlw military's 
task in keeping prospectors out of the Black Hills as "the same old story, 
the ~tory of Adam and Eve and the forbidden fruit ." .Tackwn, supra 
n. 5, at 112. In an interview with a correspondent frcm the Bismarck 
Tribune, published September 2, 1874, Custer recognized the military's 
obligation to keep all trespassers off the reservation lands, but stated that 
he would recommend to Congress "the extinguishment of the Indian title 
at the earliest moment practicable for military reasons." Krause & 
Olson, supra n. 6, at 23:~. Given the ambivalence of feeling among the 
commanding officPrs of the Army about thr practicality and desirability 
of its treaty obligations, it is perhaps not surprising that one chronicler 
of Sioux history would describe the Government's efforts to dislodge in-
vading settlers from the Black Hills as ·"feeble." F . Hans, ·The Grea-t 
Sioux Nation 522 ( 1964 reprint). 
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and the Secretary of War, and that the President had decided 
that the military should make no further resistence to the 
occupation of the Black Hills by miners, "it being his belief 
that such resistance only increased their desire a.nd compli-
cated the troubles." Id., at 59. These orders were to be 
enforced "quietly," ibid., and the President's deCision was to 
remain "confidential." !d., at 59-60 (letter from Sheridan 
to Sherman). 
With the Army's withdrawal from its role as enforcer of the 
Fort Laramie Treaty, the influx of settlers into the Black 
Hills increased. The Government concluded that the only 
practical course was to secure to the citizens of the United 
States the right to mine the Black Hills for gold. Toward 
that end, the Secretary of the Interior, in the spring of 1875, 
ap )Ointed a commission to nrgotia.te with the Sioux. The 
commission was eaaea oy i lam . AliSOn. The tribal 
leaders of the Sioux were aware of the mineral value of the 
Black Hills and refused to sell the land for a price less than 
$70 million. The commission offered the Indians an annual 
rental of $400,000, or payment of $6 million for absolute 
relinquishment of the 'Black Hills. The negotiations broke 
down.9 
In the winter of 1875-1876, many of the Sioux were hunt-
ing in the unceded territory north of the North Platte River, 
reserved to them for that purpose in the Fort Laramie-Treaty. 
On December 6, 1875, for reasons that are not entirely clear, 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs sent instructions to the 
Indian agents on the reservation to notify those hunters that 
if they did not return to the reservation agencies by January 
31, 1876, they would 'be treated as "hostiles." Given the 
9 The Report of the Allison Commission to the Secretary of the Interior 
is contained in the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
( 1875), App. 146, 158-195. The unsuccessful negotiations are described 
in some detail in Jachon, S'Upra n. 5, at 116-118, and in Robin::>on, s'Upr-a 
n. 1, at 416-421. 
,. 
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severity of the winter, compliance with these instructions was 
impossible. On February 1, the Secretary of the Interior 
nonetheless relinquished jurisdiction over all hostile Sioux, 
including those Indians exercising their treaty-protected hunt-
ing rights, to the War Department. The Army's campaign ~ 
against the "hostiles" led to Sitting Bull's notable victory 
over Custer's forces at the ba e f the Little Big Horn on 
June 25. That victory, of course, was s ort- 1ve , and those 
Indians who surrended to the Army were returned to the res-
ervation, and deprived of their weapons and horses, leaving 
them completely dependent for survival on rations provided 
them by the Government.10 
In the meantime, Congress was becoming increasingly dis-
satisfied with the failure of the Sioux living on the reservation 
to become self-sufficient.11 The Sioux' entitlement to sub-
10 The~e events arc dcscribrd by Manypenny, supra n. 7, at 294-321, 
and Robinson, supm, n. 1, at 422-438. 
11 In Dakota Twilight (1976), a history of the Standing Rock Sioux, 
Edward A. Milligan states: 
"Nearly seven year~ had elapsed since the signing of the Fort Laramie 
trl"aty and still the Sioux w!"re no closer t.o a condition of self-support 
than when the treaty was signed. In the meantime the government had 
expended nearly thirteen million dollars for their support. The future 
treatment of the Sirux became a mat.ter of serious moment, even if viewed 
from no higher standard than that of economics." ld., at 52. 
One hi;;torian has described the ration provisions of the Fort Laramie 
Treaty as part of a broader reservation system designed by Congress to 
convert nomadic tribesmen into farmers. Hagan, The Reservation Policy: 
Too Litt!e and Too Late, in Indian-White Relations: A Persistent Para-
dox 157-169 (J. Smith & R. Kvasnicka rd,;., 1976). In words applicable 
to conditions on the Sioux reservation during the years in question, Pro-
fessor Hagan stated: 
"The idea had bE'€11 to supplemrnt thr food the Indians obtained by hunt-
ing until they could subsist completely by farming. Clauses in the treaties 
permitted hunting out;;ide the strict boundaries of the reservations, but 
the inevitable cla~hes between off-re~ervation hunting parties and whites 
led this privilege to be first restricted and then eliminated. The Indiana 
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sistence rations under the terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty 
had expired in 1872. Nonetheless, in each of the two follow-
ing years, over $1 million was appropriated for feeding the 
Sioux. In August 1876, Congress enacted an appropriations 
bill providing that "hereafter there shall be no appropriation 
made for the subsistence" of the Sioux, unless they first re-
linquished their rights to the hunting grounds outside the 
reservation, ceded the Black Hills to the United States, and 
reached some accommodation with the Government that 
would be calculated to enable them to become self-support-
ing. Act of August 15, 1816, 19 Stat. 176, 192.12 Toward 
this end, Congress requested the President to appoint another 
commission to negotiate with the Sioux for the cession of the 
Black Hills. 
This commission, headed by George Manypenny, arrived 
in the Sioux country in early September and commenced 
meetings with the head men of the various tribes. - The mem-
bers of the commission impressed upon the Indians that the 
became dependent uyon government rations more quickly than had been 
anticipated, while their conv€'rsion to agriculture lagged behind schedule. 
"The quantity of food supplied by the government was never sufficient 
for a full ration, and the quality wa frequently poor. But in view of the 
fact that most treaties carried no provision for rations at all, and for 
others they were limited to four years, th€' members of Congress tended 
to look upon rations as a gratuity that should be terminated as quickly 
as possible. The Indian Service and military personnel generally agreed 
that it was better to feed than to fight, but to the typical late nineteenth-
century meml>er of Congress, not yet exposed to doctrines of social wel-
fare, there was :something obscene about grown men and women drawing 
free rations. Appropriations for Eubsistence con:,equently fell below the 
levels requested by the secretary of the interior. 
"That starvation and near-starvation conditions were present on some 
of the ~;ixty-odd reservations every year for the quarter century after the 
Civil War is manifest." Id, at 161 (footnotes omitted). 
12 The chronolrgy of the enactment of this bill does not necessarily sup-
port the view that it was pa1.1sed in reaction to Custer's Jefeat at the 
Battle of the Little Big Horn on June 25, 1876, although some historia·ns 
have taken a contrary view. See Jack;;on, supra n. 5, at 119. 
.. 
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United States no longer had any obligation to provide them 
with subsistence rations. The commissioners brought with 
them the text of a treaty that had been prepared in advance; 
The principal provisions of this treaty were that the Sioux 
would relinquish their rights to the Black Hills and other 
lands west of the one h uudred and third meridian, and their 
rights to hunt in the uuceded territories to the north, in ex-· 
change for subsistence_rations for as long as they would be 
needed to ensure the Sioux' survival. ln setting out to ob-' 
tlain the tribes' agreement t . IS rea , omm1sswn 
ignored the stipulation of th~ Fort Lar:amie Treat that any 
cession of the lands contained wjthm t e reat ioux Reser-
vation would have to be joined in by three-fourths of the 
adult males. Instead, the treaty was presented just to Sioux' ---.. 
chiefs and their leading men. It was signed by only 10% of 
the adult male Sioux po ulation.18 ~
13 The commi8sion's negotiations with the chiefs and head men is de-
IScribed by Robin~on, supra n. 1, at 439-442. He statr~: 
"As will be readily understood, the making of a treaty was a forced put, 
so· far as the Indians were concerned. Defeated, disarmrd, dismounted, · 
they wrre at the mercy of a t:~uperior power and there was no alternative · 
but to accept the conditions imposed upon tl1ein. This they did with as 
good grace as possible under all of the conditions existing." !d., at 442 .· 
Another early chrcnicler of the Black Hills region wrote of the treaty's 
provisions in the following chauvinistics terms : 
"It will be seen by studying the provisions of this treaty, that by its 
terms the Indians from a material standpoint lost much, and gained but 
little. By the first article they losr all rights to the unceded territory in 
Wyoming from which white settlers had then before been altogether ex-
cluded ; by the second they relinquish all right to the Black Hill~, and the 
frrtile valley of the Belle Fourche in Dakota, without additional material 
compensation ; by the third conceding the right of way over the unceded 
portions of their reservation ; by the fourth they receive such ~upplies 
only, as were provided by the treaty of 1868, restricted as to the points 
for receiviPg them. The only real gain to the Indians seems to be em- -
bodied in the fifth article of the treaty [Government's obligation to pro-
vide subsistence rationl:i].J The I~ dian;:;, doubtless, reaHzed .that the -Black~!' 
Hills was destined soon to slip out of their grasp, regardless of their 
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Congress resolved the impasse by enacting the 1876 "agree~ 
ment" into law as the Act of Feb. 28, 1877 (1877 Act). 
19 Stat. 254. The Act had the effect of abrogating the 
earlier Fort Laramie Treaty, and of implementing the terms 
of the Manypenny Commission's uagreement" with the Sioux 
leaders.14 
· claims, and therefore thought it best to yield to the inevitable, and accept 
whatever was offered them. 
"They were assured of a continuance of their regular daily rations, and 
certa.in annuities in clothing each year, guaranteed by the treaty of 1868, 
and what more could they ask or desire, than that a living be provided 
for themselves, their wives, their children, and all their relaticns, includ~ 
ing squaw meu, indirectly, thus leaving them free to live their wild, care-
less, unrestrained life, exempt from all the burdens and responsibilities of 
civilized existence'? In view of the fact that there are thousands who are 
obliged to earn their bread and butter by the sweat of their brows, and 
that have hard work to keep the wolf from the door, they should be satis-
fied ." Tallent, supra n. 7, at 133-134. 
u. The 1877 Act "ratified and confirmed" the agreement reached by the 
Manypenny Commission with theBioux tribes. 19 Stat. 254. It altered 
the boundaries of the Great Sioux Reservation by adding sJme 900,000 
acre::J of land to the north, while carving out virtually all that portion of 
the reservation between the one hundred and third and one hundred and 
fourth meridian:;, including the Black Hills, an art'a of well over 7 million 
acres. The Indians also relinquished their rights to hunt in the ~unceded 
lands recognized by the Fort Laramie Treaty, and agreed that three 
wagon roads could be cut through tlleir reservation . /d., at 255. 
In exchange, the Government reaffirmed its oblig'ation to provide all 
annuities called for by the Fort Laramie Treaty, and "to provide all 
necessary aid to assist the said Indiims in the work of civilization; to 
furnish to them schools and instruction in mechanical and agricultural 
arts, as provided for by the treaty of 1868." ld., at 2'56. In addition, 
every individual was to receive fixed .quantities of beef or bacon and flour, 
and other foodstuffs, in the discretion of the Commissicner of Indian 
Affairs, which "shall be continued until the Indians are able to support 
them:;elves." 1 b1d. The provision of ration~ was to be conditioned, how-
ever, on the attendance at school by Indian children, and on the labor of 
those who resided on lands suitable for farming. The Government also 
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The passage of the 1877 Act legitimized the settlers' inva-
sion of the Black Hills, but throughout the years it has been 
regarded by the Sioux as a breach of this Nation's solemn 
obligation to reserve the Hills in perpetuity for occupation 
by the Indians. One historian of the Sioux Nation com-
mented on Indian reaction to the Act in the following words: 
"The Sioux thus affected have not gotten over talking 
about that treaty yet, and during the last few years they 
have maintained an organization called the Black Hills 
rrreaty Association, which holds meetings each year at 
the various agencies for the purpose of studying the 
treaty with the intention of presenting a claim against 
the government for additional reimbursement for the 
territory ceded under it. Some think that Uncle Sam 
owes them about $9,000,000 on the deal, but it will prob-
ably be a hard matter to prove it." F. Fiske, The Tam~ 
ing of the Sioux, 132 (1917). 
Fiske's words were to prove prophetic. 
II 
Prior to 1946, Congress had not enacted any mechanism of 
general applicability by which Indian tribes could litigate 
treaty claims against the United StateS.15 The Sioux, how-
ever, after years of lobbying, succeeded in obtaining from 
Congress the passage of a special jurisdictional act which 
provided them a forum for adjudication of all claims against 
the United States "under any treaties, agreements, or laws of 
Congress or for the misappropriation of any of the funds or 
taining employment in the performance of government work on the res-
ervation. Ibid. 
Later congressional actions having the effect of further reducing the 
domain of the Great Sioux Reservation are described in Rosebud Sioux 
'l'ribe v. Kneip , 430 U. S. 584, 589 (1977). 
15 See § 9 of the Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 767; § 1 of t4e 
'ru.cker Act of Marrh 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. .505, 
·. 
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lands of said tribe or band or bands thereof." Act of June 3, 
1920, 41 Stat. 738. Pursuant to this statute, the Sioux, in 
1923, filed a petition with the Court of Claims alleging that 
the Government had taken the Black Hills without just com-
pensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This claim 
was dismissed by that court in 1942. In a lengthy and un-
animous opinion, the court concluded that it was not author-
ized by the Act of June 3, 1920, to question whether the 
compensation afforded the Sioux by Congress in 1877 was an 
adequate price for the Black Hills, and that the Sioux' claim 
in this regard was a moral claim not protected by the Just 
Compensation Clause. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 97 Ct. 
Cl. 613 (1942) , cert. denied, 318 U. S. 789 (1943) . 
In 1946, Congress passed the Indian Claims Commission - ------Act, 60 Stat. 1049, 25 U. S. C. § 70 et seq., creating a new 
forum to hear and determine all tribal grievances that had 
arisen previously. In 1950, counsel for the Sioux resub-
mitted the Black Hills claim to the Indian Claims Commis-
sion. The Commission initially ruled that the Sioux had 
failed to prove their case. Sioux Tribe v. United States, 
2 Ind. Cl. Comm'n 646 (1954) , aff'd, 146 F. Supp. 229 (Ct. 
Cl. 1956) . The Sioux filed a motion with the Court of 
Claims to vacate its judgment of affirmance, alleging that the 
Commission's decision had been based on a record that was 
inadequate, due to the failings of the Sioux' former counsel. 
This motion was granted and the Court of Claims directed 
the Commission to consider whether the case should be re-
opened for the presentation of additional evidence. On No-
vember 19, 1958, the Commission entered an order reopening 
the case and announcing that it would reconsider its prior 
judgment on the merits of the Sioux claim. App. 265-266; 
see Si<YUx Tr·ibe v. United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 912 (1968) 
(summary of proceedings) . 
Following the Sioux' filing of an amended petition, claim-
ing again that the 1877 Act constituted a taking of the Black 
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Hills for which just compensation had not been paid, there 
ensued a lengthy period of procedural sparring between the 
Indians and the Government. Finally, in October 1968, the 
Commission set down three questions for briefing and deter-
mination: (1) What land and rights did the United States 
acquire from the Sioux by the 1877 Act? (2) What, if any, 
consideration was given for that land and those rights? and 
(3) If there was no consideration for the Government's ac-
quisition of the land and rights under the 1877 Act, was there 
any payment for such acquisition? App. 266. 
Six years later, by a 4-1 vote, the Qommiss!Qn rei!Q..hed a 
preliminary decision on these questions. Sioux Nation v. 
Un~nd. Cl. Comm'n 151 (1974). The Com-
mission first held that the 1942 Court of Claims decision did 
not bar the SiOux' Fifth Amendment taking claim through 
application of the doctrine of res judicata. The Commission 
concluded that the Court of Claims had dismissed the earlier 
suit for lack of jurisdiction, and that it had not determined 
the merits of the Black Hills claim. The Commission then 
went on to find that Congress, in 1877, had made no effort to 
give the Sioux full value for the ceded reservation lands. 
The only new obligation assumed by the Government in ex-
change for the Black Hills was its promise to provide the 
Sioux with subsistence rations, an obligation that was subject 
to several limiting conditions. See n. 14, supra. Under 
these circumstances, the Commission concluded that the con-
sideration given the Indians in the 1877 Act had no relation-
ship to the value of the property acquired. Moreover, there 
was no indication in the record that Congress ever attempted 
to relate the value of the rations to the value of the Black 
Hills. Applying· the principles announced by the Court of 
Claims in Three Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. 
United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 543, 390 F. 2d 686 ( 1968), the 
Commission concluded that Congress had acted pursuant to 
its power of eminent doma.in when it passed the 1877 Act, 
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rather than as a trustee for the Sioux, and that the Govern-
ment must pay the Indians just compensation for the taking 
of the Black Hills.16 
The Government filed an appeal with the Court of Claims 
from the Commission's interlocutory order, arguing alterna-
tively that the Sioux' Fifth Amendment claim should have 
been barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estop-
pel, or that the 1877 Act did not effect a taking of the Blac·k 
Hills for which just compensation was due. Without reach-
ing the merits, the Court of Claims held that the Black Hills 
claim was barred by the res judicata effect of its 1942 deci-
sion. United States v. Sioux Nation, 207 Ct. Cl. 234, 518 
F. 2d 1298 (1975). The court's majority recognized that the 
practical impact of the question presented was limited to a 
determination of whether or not an award of interest would 
be available to the Indians. This followed from the Gov-
--~"---ernment's failure to appeal the Commission's hold at it 
had acquired the Blac·k Hills through a course of unfair and 
disi!__onorable ~ali~g for which the SiOux were entitled to 
damages, without mterest, under § 2 of the Indian Claims 
Commission Act, 60 Stat. 1050, 25 U. S. C. ~ 70a (5). Only 
if the acquisition of the 'Black Hills amounted to an uncon. 
16 The Commission determined that the fair market value of the Black 
Htlls as of February 28, 1977, was $17.1 million. In addition, the 
United States was held liable for gold removed by trrspassing prosprctors 
prior to that. date, with a fair market value in the ground of $450,000. 
The Commission determined that the Govrrnment should receive a credit 
fer all amounts it had paid to tJH• Indians over the years in complinnce 
with its obligations under the 1877 Act Tht•se amounts were to be 
credited again~t the fair market. value of thr lands and gold t.akrn, and 
interest as it accrued. The Commission decided that further procredings 
would be necessary to compute the amounts to be credited nnd the value 
of the rights of way across the reservation that the Government also had 
acquired through the 1877 Act. 
Chairman Kuykendall dissented in part from the Commission's judg-
ment, arguing that the Sioux' taking claim was barred by the res juUicata 
· effect of .the 1942 Co.t1rt of Chums decision. 
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stitutional taking would the Sioux be entitled to interest, 
/d., at 237, 518 F. 2d, at 1299.17 
The court affirmed the Commission's holding that a want 
offair and honorable dealings in this case was evidenced, and lJ 
held that the Sioux thus would be entitled to an award of at cp J 7 ~ 
least $17.5 million for the lands surrendered ru;dfor the gold • > . 
taken bY"'t'fesp'7l8;ing prospectors prior to passage of the 1877 
Act. See n. 16, supra. The Court also remarked upon 
President Grant's duplicity in breaching the Government's 
treaty obligationtokeep trespassers out of the Black Hills, 
and the pattern of duress practiced by the Government on 
the starving Sioux o get em o agree o t e sa e of the 
I 
Black Hills. The court conCluded: "A more ripe and rank 
case of dishonorable dealings will never, in all pr015aBittty,"ire 
f ~ is not, taken as a whole, the dis-
grace it now pleases some persons to believe." /d., at 241, 
518 F. 2d, at 1302. 
17 See United Stutes v. T£/lamooks, 341 U. S. 48, 49 (1951) (recogniz-
ing that the " traditional rule" is that interest is not to be awarded on 
claims against the United States absent an express statutory provision 
to the contrary and that the "only exception arises when the taking 
entitles the claimant to just compensation under the Fifth Amendment"). 
In United States v. Klamath Indians, 304 U. S. 119, 121 (1938), the 
Court stated: "The established rule is that the taking of property by 
the United States in the exertion of its power of eminent domain implies 
a promise to pay just compensation, i. e., value at the time of the taking 
plus an amount sufficient to produce the full equivalent of that value 
paid contemporaneously with the taking." 
The Court of Claims also noted that subsequent to the Indian Claims 
Commission's judgment, Congress had enacted an amendment to 25 
U. S. C. § 70a, providing generally that expenditures made by the Gov-
ernment "for food , rations, or provisions shall not be deemed payments on 
the claim." Act of October 27, 1974, § 2, 88 Stat. 1499. Thus, the 
Government would no longer be entitled to an offset from any judgment. 
eventually awarded the Sioux based on its appropriations for subsistence 
rations in the years following the passage of the 1877 ·Act. 207 Ct. Cl., 
at :240,· 518 F. 2d 1 at 1301. See n. 161 supra. 
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Nonetheless, the court held that the merits of the Sioux' rl /'A 
taking claim had b~en re~i~nd whether resolved C f ~ 
"rightly or wrongly," id., at 249,~2d, at 1306, t~m ;J~ L~ 
was now barred by res judicata. The court observed that in- -; 
terest could not be awar e Sioux on judgments obtained ....,.<.h_ 
pursuant to the Indian Claims Commission Act, and that "1A~ 
while Congress could correct this situation, the court could /~..._-----. -
not. /bid. 18 The Sioux petitioned this Court for a writ of 
certiorari, but that petition was denied. 423 U. S. 1016 
(1975). 
The case returned to the Indian Claims Commission, where 
the value of the rights of way obtained by the Government 
through the 1877 Act was determined to be $3,484, and where 
it was decided that the Government had made no payments 
to the Sioux that could be considered as offsets. App. 316. 
The Government then moved the Commission to enter a final 
award in favor of the Sioux in the amount of $17.5 million, 
see n. 16, supra, but the Commission deferred entry of final 
judgment in view of legislation then pending in Congress that 
dealt with this case. 
On March 13, 1978, Congress passed a statute providing for 
Court of Claims review of the merits of the Indian Cla.ims 
Commission's judgment that the 1877 Act effected a. taking 
of the Black Hills, without regard to the defenses of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel. The statute authorized the 
Court of Claims to take new evidence in the case, and to con-
duct its review of the merits de novo. Pub. L. 95-243, 92 
Stat. 153, amending § 20 (b) of the Indian Claims Commis-
sion Act. See 25 U. S. C. § b) (1976 ed., Supp. II). 
Acting pursuant to that statute, a majority of the Court of 
Claims, sitting en bane, in an opinion by Chief Judge Fried-
18 Judge Davis dissented with respect to the court's holding on res 
judicata , arguing that the Sioux had not had the opportunity to present 
their claim fully in 1942. 207 Ct. Cl., at 249, 518 F . 2d, at 1306. 
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man, affirmed the Commission's holding that the 1877 Act 
e~ng of the Black Hills and of rights of way across 
the reservation. Sioux Nation v. United States, 220 Ct. Cl. 
-, 601 F. 2d 1157 (1979). 19 In doing so, the court applied 
the test it had earlier articulated in Fort Berthold, 182 Ct. Cl., 
at 553, 390 F. 2d, at 691, asking whether Congress had made 
"a good faith effort to give the Indians the full value of the 
land," 220 Ct. Cl., at -, 601 F. 2d, at 1162, in order to 
decide whether the 1877 Act had effected a taking or whether 
it had been a noncompensable act of congressional guardian-
ship over tribal property. The court characterized the Act 
as a taking. an exercise of Congress' power of eminent domain 
over Indian property. It distinguished broad statements 
seemingly leading to a contrary result in Lone Wolf v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), as inapplicable to a case involving 
a claim for just compensation. ld., at -, 601 F. 2d, at 
1170.20 
The court thus held that the Sioux were entitled to an 
award of interest, at the annua1 rate of 5%, on the principal 
sum of $17.1 million, dating from 1877.21 
10 While affirming the Indian Claims CommiEsion's detennination that 
the acquisition of the Black Hills and the rights-of-way acro::s the reser-
vation constituted takings, the court rever~ea tbe Commission's determi-
nation that the mining of gold from tbe Black Hills by prospectors prior 
to 1877 also constituted a taking. The value of tl1e gold, therefore, could 
not be considered as part of the principal on which interest wculd be 
paid to the Sioux. 220 Ct. Cl., at -, 601 F. 2d, at 1171-1172. 
20 The Lone Wolf decision it~elf involved an action by tribal leaders to 
enjoin the enforcement of a statute that had the effe~t of abrogating the 
provisions of an earlier-enacted treaty with an Indian tribe. See Part 
IV-B. iufra. 
21 Judge Nichols concurred in the result, and aU of the court'~ opinion 
except that portion distinguishing Lone Wolf. He would have he1d Lone 
1V olf's principles inapplicable to this case becau:se Congre~~ had not 
created a record showing that it had considered the compen:sation afforded 
the Sioux under the 1877 Act to be adequate con~ideration for the Black 
Hills. He did not believe that Lone Wolf could be distinguished on the 
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We granted the Government's petition for a writ of certio-
rari, - U. S. - (1979), in order to review the important 
constitutional questions presented by this case, questions not 
only of long-standing concern to the Sioux, but also of sig-
nificant economic import to the Government. 
III 
Having twice denied petitions for certiorari in this litiga-
tion, see 318 U. S. 789 (1943); 423 U. S. 1016 (1975), we 
are confronted with it for a third time as a result of the 
amendment, above noted, to the Indian Claims Commission 
Act of 1946,25 U.S. C. §70s (b) (1976 ed., Supp. II), which 
directed the Court of Claims to review the merits of the ~AA'~ _.. 1--~ _ 
Black Hillit;ki'ngs Claun Witli_out regilla to the defense of ­
res judicata. The amendment, approved March 13, 1978, 
p;ovides: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of la.w, upon ap-
plication by the claimants within thirty days from the 
date of the enactment of this sentence, the Court of 
Claims shall review on the merits, without regard to the 
defense of res judicata or collateral estoppel, that por-
tion of the determination of the Indian Claims Com-
mission entered February 15, 1974, adjudging that the 
Act of February 28, 1877 (19 Stat. 254), effected a taking 
of the Black Hills portion of the Great Sioux Reserva-
tion in violation of the fifth amendment, and shall enter 
ground that it involved an action for injunctive relief rather than a claim 
for just compensation. 220 Ct. Cl., at-, 601 F. 2d, at 1175-1176. 
Judge Bennett, joined by Judge Kunzig, dissented. The dissentt:'r>'3 
would have read Lone Wolf broadly to hold that it was within Congress' 
ronptituticnal power to dispose of tribal property without regard to good 
fnith or the amount of compensation givrn. "The law wr ~hould rtpply 
is that once Congress has, through negotiation or statute, recognizt:'d the 
Indian tribes' rights in the property, has disposed of it, and has given 
value to the Indians for it, that is the end of the matter." !d., at-, 
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judgmeut accordingly. In conducting such review, the 
Court shaH receive and consider any additioual evidence, 
including oral testimony, that either party may wish to 
provide on the issue of a fifth amendment taking and 
shall determi11e that issur de novo " H2 Stat. 153. 
Before turning to the ments of the Court of Claims' con-
clusion that the Act of February 28, 1877, effected a taking 
of the Black Hills, we must consider the question whether 
Congress, in enacting this 1978 amendment, "has inadvert-
ently passed the limit which separat egislati ve from the 
judicial power." United States . Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 147 
(1872). 
A 
There arc two objections that might be raised to the consti-
tutionality of this amendment, each framed in terms of the 
doctrine of separatiOn of powers. The first would be that 
Congress Impermissibly ha.s disturbed the finality of a judicial 
decree by rendering the Court of Claims' earlier judgments in 
this case mere advisory opinions. See Hayburn's Case, 2 
Dall. 409, 410-414 (1792) (setting forth the views of three 
Circuit Courts, including among their complements Chief 
Justice Jay, and Justices Cushing, Wilson, Blair, and Iredell, 
that the Act of March 23, 1792, 1 Stat. 243, was unconstitu-
tional because it subjected the decisions of the Circuit Courts 
concerning eligibility for pension benefits to review by the 
Secretary of War and the Congress). The objection would 
take the form that Congress, in directing the Court of Claims 
to reach the merits of the Black Hills claim, efi'ectively re-
viewed and reversed that court's 1975 judgment that the 
claim was barred by res judicata, or its 194 Judgment that 
the claim was not cognizable under the Fifth Amendment. 
Such legislative review of a judicial decision would interfere 
with the independent functions of the Judiciary. 
The second objection would be that Congress overstepped 
its bounds by granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction . to 
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decide the merits of the Black Hills claim, while prescribing 
a rule for decision that left the Court no adjudicatory func-
tion to perform. See United States v. 'Klein, 13 Wall., at 
146; Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 467-468 ( 1944) 
(Rutledge, J., dissenting). Of course, in the context of this 
amendment, that objection wou1d have to be framed in terms 
of Congress' removal of a sh1gle issue from the Court of 
Claims' purview, the question whether res judicata or col-
lateral estoppel barred the Sioux' claim. For in passing the 
amendment, Congress left no doubt that the Court of Claims 
was free to decide the merits of the takings claim in accord-
ance with the evidence it found and applicable rules of law. 
See n. 23, infra. 
These objections to the constitutionality of the amendment 
were not raised by the Government before the Court of 
Claims. At oral argument in this Court, counsel for the 
U'nited States, upon explicit questioning advanced the posi-
tion that the amendment was not beyond the limits of leg-
islative power. 22 The question whether the amendment 
impermissibly interfered with judicial power was debated, 
however, in the House of Representatives, and that body con-
cluded that the Government's waiver of a "technical legal 
defense" in order to permit the Court of Claims to recon-
sider the merits of the Black Hills claim was within CongTess• 
power to enact. 28 
22 In response to a question from the bench, government counsel stated: 
" I think Congress is entitled to ~ay, 'You may have another opportunity 
to litigate your lawsuit." Tr. of Oral Arg. ZO. 
23 R·epresentative Gudger of North Carolina persistently argued the view 
that the amendment unconstitutionally int.erefered with the power~:; of the 
Judiciary. He dissented from the Committee Report in support of the 
amendment's enactment, stating : 
"I do not feel that. when the Federal Judiciary has adjudicated a matter 
through appella.te review and no error has been found by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in the application by the lower court (in this 
instance the Court of Claims) of the doctrine of res judicata or collatera1 
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The question debated on the floor of the House is one the 
answer to which is not immediately apparent. It requires 
us to examine the proper role of Congress and the courts in 
which has the effect of reversing the decision of the Judiciary." H. R. 
Rep. No. 95-529, p. 17 (1977). 
Repre:oentative Gudger stated that he could support a bill to grant a 
special appropriation to the Sioux Nation, acknowledging that it wall for 
the purpo~e of extinguishing Congress' moral obligation arising from the 
Black Hills claim, "but I cannot justify in my own mind this exerci;;e of 
congressional review of a judicial decis!on which I consider contravenes 
our €xclu:;ively legislative responsibility under the separation of powers 
doctrine." !d., at 18. 
The Congressman, in the House debates, elaborated upon his views on 
the ccnstituticnality of the amendment. He stated that the amendment 
would create "a real and serious departure from the separation-of-powers 
doctrine, which I think should continue to govern us and has governed 
us in the past." 124 Cong. Rec. H897 (Feb. 9, 1978). He continued: 
"I submit that this bill has the precise and exact effect of rever~ing a 
decillion of the Court of Claims which has heretofore been sustained by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. Thus, it places the Congress 
of the United States in the position of reviewing and reversing a judicial 
decillion in direct violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine so basic 
to our tripartite form of government. 
"I call to your attention that, in this instance, we are not asked to 
chango the law, applicable uniformly to all cases of like nature throughout 
the land, but that this bill proposes to change the application of the law 
with respect to one case only. In doing this, we are not legislating, we 
are adjudicating. Moreover, we are performing the adjudicatory func-
tion with respect to a case on which the Supreme Court of the United 
States has acted. Thus, in this in~tance, we propose to reverse the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court of our land." Ibid. 
Repre::;entative Gudger's views on the effect of the amendment vis-a-vis 
the independent powers of the Judiciary were not shared by his colleagues .. 
Representative Roncalio lltated: 
"I want to emphas~ze that the bill doe::; not make a congressional deter-· 
mination of whether or not the United States violated the Fifth Amend~ 
ment . It does not say that the Sioux are entitled to the interest on the· 
$17,500,000 award. It says that the court will review the fact~ and law 
in the case and determine that quetition." !d., at H898. 
Representative Roncalio altio informed the Hou;;e that Congrel:is in the· 
pa,;t had enacted li>gislation waiving the defenl:ie of res judicata in priv.at~ 
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recognizing and determining claims against the United States, 
in light of more general principles concemiug the legislative 
claims rases, and had done so twice with respect to Indian claims. Ibid. 
He mentioned the Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 139, 21 Stat. 504 (which 
actually waived the effect of a prior award made to the Choctaw Nation 
by the Senate), nnd the Act of February 7, 1925, ch. 148, 43 Stat. 812 
(authorizing the Court of Claim:,; and the Supreme Court to consider 
claim;; of the Dealware Tribe "de novo, upon a legnl and equitable basis, 
and without regard to any decision, finding, or settlement heretofore had 
in respect of any such claims"). Both those enactments were also brought 
to the attention of a Senate ;;ubcommittee in hearings on thi;; amendment 
conducted during the previous legislative se;;;;ion. See Hearings on S: 2780 
before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Senate Committee on 
Interior and InHular Affairs, 94th Con g., 2d Ses~:;., 16-17 ( 1976) (letter 
from Morris Thompson, Commiosioner of Indian Affairs). The enact-
ment~ referred to by Representative Roncalio were construed, re:pec-
tively. in Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U. S. 1, 29-32 (1886), 
and Delaware Tribe v. United States, 74 Ct. Cl. 368 (1932). 
Repre~entative Pres:;ler also responded to Repre;;entative Gudger's inter-
pretation of the proposed amendment, arguing that "[w]r are, inde2d, 
here a;;king for a review and providing the groundwork for a review. I 
do not believe that we would be reviewing a dec;sion; indeed, the same 
decision might be reached." 124 Cong. Rec. H899 (Feb. 9, 1978). 
Earlier, Representative Meeds clearly had articulated the prevailing con-
gressional view on the effect of the propC>sed amendment. After sum-
marizing the history of the Black Hills litigation, he stated: 
"I go through that rather complicated history for the purpos·e of point-
ing out, to the Members that the purpose of thi~:; legislation is not to 
decide the matter on the merits. That is still for the court to do. · The· 
purpooe of thi::; legislation is only to waiYe the defen::;e of re;; judicata and 
to waive this technical defense, as we have done in a number of other 
in::;ta.nces in this body, so this most important claim can get before the' 
courts again and can be decided without a technical defense and on the 
merits ." !d., at H668 (Feb. 6, 1978). 
See a!w S. Rep. No. 95-112, p. 6 (1977) ("The enactment of [the amend-· 
ment1 is needed to waive certain legal prohibitions so that the Sioux 
tribal claim may be considered on its merits before an appropriate · judicial 
forum.") ; H. R. Rep . No. 95-529, p. 6 (1977) ("The enactment of [the· 
amendmentJ is needed to waive certain technical legal defens;>s so that the-
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ami judicial roles ill our tripartite system of government. Our 
examination of the amendment's effect, and this Court's prece-
dents, leads us to conclude that neither of the two separation 
of powers objections described above is presented by this 
legislation. 
B 
Our starting point is Cherokee Nation v. United States, 270 
U. S. 476 (1926). That decision concerned the Special Act 
of Congress, dated March 3, 1919, 40 Stat. 1316, conferring 
jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims "to hear, consider, and 
determine the claim of the Cherokee Nation against the 
United States for interest, in addition to all other interest 
heretofore allowed and paid, alleged to be owing from the 
United States to the Cherokee Nation on the funds arising 
from the judgment of the Court of Claims of May eighteenth, 
11ineteen hundred and five. " In the judgment referred to by 
the Act, the Court of Claims had allowed 5% simple interest 
on four Cherokee claims, to accrue from the date of liability. 
Cherokee Nation v. United States, 40 Ct. Cl. 252 (1905). 
This Court had affirmed that judgment, including the interest 
award. United States v. Cherokee Nation, 202 U. S. 101, 
123- 126 (1906). Thereafter, and following payment of the 
judgment, the Cherokee presented to Congress a new claim 
that they were entitled to compound interest on the lump 
sum of principal and interest that had accrued up to 1895. 
It was this claim that prompted Congress, in 1919, to reconfer 
,jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to consider the Cherokee's 
entitlement to that additional interest. 
Ultimately, this Court held that the Cherokee were not 
entitled to the payment of compound interest on the original 
judgment awarded by the Court of Claims. 270 U. S., at 
487- 496. Before turning to the merits of the interest claim, 
however, the Court considered "the effect of the Act of 1919 
in referring the issue in this case to the Court of Claims.'' 
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270 U. S., at 485-486. The Court's conclusion concerning 
that question bears close examination: 
"The judgment of this Court in the suit by the Cherokee 
Nation against the United States, in April, 1906 (202 
U. S. 101), already referred to, awarded a large amount 
of interest. The question of interest was considered and 
decided, and it is quite clear that but for the special Act 
of 1919, above quoted, the question here mooted would 
have been foreclosed as res judicata. In passing the 
Act, Cougress must have been well advised of this, and 
the only possible construction therefore to be put upon 
it is that Congress has therein expressed its desire, so far 
as the question of interest is concerned, to waive the 
effect of the judgment as res judicata, and to direct the 
Court of Claims to re-examine it and determine whether 
the interest therein allowed was all that should have 
been allowed, or whether it should be found to be as now 
claimed by the Cherokee Nation. The Solicitor Gen-
eral, representing the Government, properly concedes this 
to be the correct view. 'l'he power of Congress to waive 
S'Uch an adjudioation of course is clear." 270 U. S., at 
486 (last emphasis supplied). 
The holding in Cherokee Nation that Congress has the 
power to waive the res judicata efl'ect of a prior judgment 
entered in the Government's favor on a claim against the 
United States is dispositive of the question considered here. 
Moreover, that holding is consistent with a substantial body 
of precedent affirming tbe broad constitutional power of Con-
gress to define and "to pay the Debts ... of the United 
States." U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. That precedent 
speaks directly to the separation of powers objections discussed 
above. 
The scope of Congress' power to pay the Nation's debts 
see:ms fi.r.st to have been construed by this Court in United 
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States v. Realty Company, 163 U.S. 427 (1896). There, the 
Court stated: 
"The term 'debts' includes those debts or claims which 
rest upon a merely equitable or honorary obligation, and 
which would not be recoverable in a court of law if exist-
ing against an individual. The nation, speaking broadly, 
owes a 'debt' to an individual wben bis c1aim grows out 
of general princip1es of right and justice; when, in other 
words, it is based upou considerations of a moral or 
merely honorary nature, such as are binding on the con-
science or the honor of an individual, although the debt 
could obtain no recognition in a court of law. The power 
of Congress extends at least as far as the recognition and 
payment of claims against the government which are 
thus founded." ld., at 440. 
Other decisions clearly establish that Congress may recog-
llize its obligation to pay a moral debt not only by direct 
appropriation, but also by wa.iving an otherwise valid defense 
to a legal claim against the United States, as CongTess did in 
this case and in Cherokee Nation. Although, the Court in 
Cherokee Nation did not expressly tie its conclusion that 
Congress had the power to waive the res judicata effect of a 
judgment in favor of the United States to Congress' consti-
tutional power to pay the Nation's debts, the Cherokee 
Nation opinion did rely on the decision in Nock v. United 
States, 2 Ct. Cl. 451 (1867). See 270 U. S., at 486. 
In N ock, the Court of Claims was confronted with the 
precise question whether Congress invaded judicial power 
when it enacted a joint resolution, 14 Stat. 608, directing that 
court to decide a damage claim against the United States "in 
accordance with the principles of equity and justice," even 
though the merits of the claim previously had been resolved 
in the Government's favor. The court rejected the Govern-
ment's argument that the joint resolution was unconstitu-
tional as an exercise of ' ~j udicia1 powers" because it had the 
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effect of setting aside the court's prior judgment. Rather, 
the court concluded: 
"It is unquestionable that the Constitution has invested 
Congress with no judicial powers; it cannot be doubted 
that a legislative direction to a court to find a judgment 
in a certain way would be little less than a judgment 
rendered directly by Congress. But here Congress do 
not attempt to award judgment, nor to grant a new trial 
judicwlly; neither have they reversed a decree of this 
court; nor attempted in any way to interfere with the 
administration of justice. Congress are here to all in-
tents and purposes the defendants, and as such they 
come into court through this resolution and say that they 
will not plead the former trial in bar, nor interpose the 
legal objection which defeated a recovery before." 2 Ct. 
Cl., a.t 457-458 (emphasis in original). 
The N ock court thus expressly rejected the applicability of 
separation of powers objections to a congressional decision to 
waive the res judicata effect of a judgment in the Govern-
ment's favor. 24 
24 The joint resolution at issue in Nock also limited the amount of the 
judgment. that the Court. of Claims could award Nock to a sum that had 
been established in a report of tl1e Solicitor of the Treasury to the Senate. 
See 14 Stat. 608. The court rejected the Government's argument that 
the Constitution had not vested in Congress "such discretion to fetter or 
circumscribe the comse of justice." See 2 Ct. CI., at 455. The court 
reasoned that this limitation on the amount, of the claimant's recovery 
was a valid exercise of Congress, power to condition waivers of the sov-
ereign immunity of the United States. "[I]t would be enough to say 
that the defendants cannot be sued except with their own consent; and 
Congress have the same power to give this consent to a second action as 
they had to give it to a first ." Id., a.t 458. 
Just because we have addrcs~ed our attention to the ancient Court of 
Claims' deri~ion iu Nock, it ~hould not be inferred that legi:;lative artion 
of the type at issue here is a remnant of the far-distant past. Specia1 
juri:;dictional acts waiving affirmative defenses of the United States to 
legal <rlaitns, and directing the Court of Claims to resolve the merits of 
' J. 
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The principles set forth in Cherokee Nation and Nock were 
substantially reaffirmed by this Court in Pope v. United 
States, 323 U. S. 1 (1944). There Congress had enacted 
special legislation conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of 
Claims, "notwithstanding any prior determination, any stat-
those claims, are legion. See Mizokami v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 736, 
740-741, and nn. 1 and 2, 414 F. 2d 1375, 1377, and nn. 1 and 2 (1969) 
(collecting cases). A list of cases, in addition to tho~:;e discussed in the 
text, that have recognized or acted upon Congress' power to wa.ive the 
defense of res judicata to claims against the United States follows (the 
li~;t is not intended to be exhau~;tive): United States v. Grant, 110 U. S. 
225 (1884); Lamborn t~ Co. v. United States, 106 Ct. Cl. 703, 724-728, 
G5 F. Supp. 569, 576-578 (1946); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 
101 Ct. Cl. 10, 19 (1944); Richardson v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 948, 
956-957 (1935); Delaware Tribe v. United States, 74 Ct. Cl. 368 (1932); 
Garrett v. United States, 70 Ct. Cl. 304, 310-312 ( 1930). 
In Richardson, the Court of Claims observed: 
"The power of Congress by special act to waive any defense, either legal 
or equitable, which the Government may have to a suit in this court, as 
it did in the Nock and Cherokee Nation cases, has never been questioned. 
The reports of the court are replete with ca:;es where Congress, impressed 
with the equitable justice of claims which have been rejected by the court 
on legal grounds, has, any special act, waived defenses of the Government 
which prevented recovery and conferred jurisdiction on the court to again 
adjudicate the case. In such instances the court proceeded in conformity 
with the provisions of the act of reference and in cases, too numerous for 
citation here, awarded judgment:; to claimants whose claims had previ-
ously been rejected." 81 Ct. Cl., at 957. 
Two similar decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit. are of int·erest.. Both involved t11e constitutionality of a 
joint resolution that set aside dismissals of actions brought under the 
World War Ve1erans' Act, 1924, 38 U. S. C. § 445 (1952 ed.), and au-
thorized the reim;tatement of those war risk Insurance disability claims. 
The Court of Appeals found no constitutional prohibition against a con-
gre:;,;ional waiver of an adjudication in the Government's favor, or against 
conferring upon claimants against the United States the right to have 
their cal:le:; heard again on the merits. See James v. United States, 8'i 
F . 2d 897, 898 (CA8 1937); United States v. Hossmann, 84 F. 2d 808, 
810 (CA8 1936). The court relied, in part, on the holding in Cheroke~; 
Nation, and the sovereign immunity rationale applied in Noek. 
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ute of limitations, release, or prior acceptance of partial 
allowance, to hear, determine, and render judgment upon1' 
certain claims against the United States arising out of a con-
struction contract. Special Act of February 27, 1942, § 1, 56 
Stat. 1122. The court was a1so directed to determine Pope's 
claims and render judgment upon them according to a par-
t icular formula for measuring the value of the work that he 
hacl performed. The Court of Claims construed the Special 
Act as deciding the questions of law presented by the case, 
and leaving it the role merely of computing the amount of 
the judgment for the claimant according to a mathematical 
formula. Pope v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. ·375, 379~380, 53 
F . Supp. 570, 571-572 (1944). Based upon that reading of 
the Act, and this Court's decision in United States v. Klein, 
13 Wall. 128 (1872) (see discussion 'infra, at - ), the Court 
of Claims held that the Act unconstitutionally interfered with 
judicial independence. 100 Ct. Cl., at 380-382, 53 F. Supp., 
at 572- 573. It distinguisbed Cherokee Nation as a case ·in 
which Congress granted a claimant a new trial , without di-
recting the courts how to decide the case. I d., at 387, and 
n. 5, 53 F. Supp. , at 575, and n. 5. 
This Court reversed the Court of Claims' judgment. In 
doing so, the Court difi'ered with the Court of Claims' inter-
pretation of the efi'ect of the Special Act. First, the Court 
held that the Act did not disturb the earlier judgment deny-
ing Pope's claim for damages. "While inartistically drawn 
the Act's purpose and effect seem rather to have been to 
create a new obligation of the Government to pay petitioner's 
claims where no obligation existed before." 323 U. S., at 9. 
Second, the Court held that Congress' recognition of Pope's 
claim was within its power to pay the Nation's debts, and 
that its use of the Court of Claims as an instrument for exer-
cising that power did not impermissibly invade the judicial 
function : 
""\Ve perceive no constitutional obstade to Congress' 
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there had been none before, for work performed by peti-
tioner which was beneficial to the Goverment and for 
which Congress thought he had not been adequately 
compensated. The power of Congress to provide for the 
payment of debts, conferred by § 8 of Article I of the 
Constitution, is not restricted to payment of those obli-
gations which are legally binding on the Government. 
It extends to the creation of such obligations in recogni-
tion of claims which are merely moral or honorary .... 
United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427. . . . Congress, 
by the creation of a legal, in recognition of a moral, obli-
gation to pay petitioner's claims plainly did not encroach 
upon the judicial function which the Court of Claims had 
previously exercised in adjudicating that the obligation 
was not legal. [Footnote citing N ock and other cases 
omitted.l Nor do we think it did so by directing that 
court to pass upon petitioner's claims in conformity to 
the particular rule of liability prescribed by the Special 
Act and to give judgment accordingly ... see Cherokee 
Nation v. United States, 270 U. S. 476, 486." 323 U. S., 
at 9-10. 
In explaining its holding that the Special Act d:d not in-
vade the judicial province of the Court of Claims by direct-
ing it to reach its judgment with reference to a specified 
formula, the Court stressed that Pope was required to pursue 
his claim in the usual manner, that the earlier factual findings 
made by the Court of Claims were not necessarily rendered 
conclusive by the Act, and that, even if Congress had stipu-
lated to the facts, it was still a judicial function for the Court 
of Claims to render judgment on consent. Id., at 10-12. 
To be sure, the Court in Pope specifically declined to con-
sider "just what application the principles announced in the 
Klein case could rightly be given to a case in which Con~ress 
sought, pendente lite, to set aside the judgment of the Court 
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gation of the suit." !d., a.t 8-9. The case before us might 
be viewed as presenting that question. We conclude, how-
ever, that the separation of powers question presented in this 
case has already been answered in Cherokee Nation, and that 
that answer is completely consistent with the principles artic-
ulated in Klein. 
The decisio · United States v. Klein 13 Wall. 128 (1872), 
arose from tl following facts: was the administrator 
of the estate of e deceased owner of property 
that had been sold by agents of the Government during the 
War Between the States. Klein sued the United States in 
the Court of Claims for the proceeds of that sale. His law-
suit was based on the Abandoned and Captured Property Act 
of March 12, 1863, 12 Stat. 820, which afforded such a cause 
of action to noncombatant property owners upon proof that 
they had "never given any aid or comfort to the present re-
bellion." Following the enactment of this legislation, Presi-
dent Lincoln has issued a proclamation granting "a full 
pardon" to certain persons engaged "in the existing rebellion" 
who desired to resume their allegiance to the Government, 
upon the condition that they take and maintain a prescribed 
oath. This pardon was to have the effect of restoring those 
persons' property rights. See 13 Stat. 737. · The Court of 
Claims held that" Wilson's taking of the amnesty oath had 
cured his participation in "the ... rebellion," and that his 
administrator, Klein, was thus entitled to the proceeds of the 
sale. Wilson v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 559 (1869). 
The Court of Claims' decision in Klein's case was consistent 
with this Court's later decision in a similar case, United States 
v. Padelford, 9 Wall. 531 (1870), holding that the presidential 
pardon pqrged a participant "of whatever offence against the 
laws of the United States he had committed ... and relieved 
[him 1 from any penalty which he might have incurred." 
ld., at 543. Following the Court's announcement of the 
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to the appropriations bill for the Court of Claims. The pro-
viso had three effects: First, no presidential pardon or am-
nesty was to be admiss ble in evidence on behalf of a claim-
ant in the Court of Claims as the proof of loyalty required 
by the Abandoned and Captured Property Act. Second, the 
Supreme Court was to dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, any 
appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims in favor of 
a claimant who had established his loyalty through a pardon. 
Third, the Court of Claims henceforth was to treat a claim-
ant's receipt of a presidential pardon, without protest, as 
conclusive evidence that he had given aid and comfort to the 
rebellion, and to dismiss any lawsuit on his behalf for want 
of jurisdiction. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 
235. 
The Government's appeal from the judgment in Klein's 
case was decided by this Court following the enactment of 
the appropriations proviso. This Court held the proviso un-
constitutional notwithstanding Congress' recognized power 
"to make 'such exceptions from the appellate jurisdiction' 
[of the Supreme Court] as should seem to it expedient." 13 
Wall., at 145. See U. S. Canst., Art. III, § 2, cl. 2. This 
holding followed from the Court's interpretation of the pro-
viso's effect: 
"[T]he language of the proviso shows plainly that it 
does not intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except 
as a means to an end. Its great and controlling purpose 
is to deny to pardons granted by the President the effect 
which this court had adjudged them to have." 13 Wall., 
at 145. 
Thus, construed, the proviso was unconstitutional in two 
respects: First, it prescribed a rule of decision in a case pend-
ing before the courts, and did so in a manner that required 
the courts to decide a controversy in the Government's favor. 
"The court is required to ascertain the existence of 
certain facts and thereupon to declare that its jurisdic-
·. 
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tion on appeal has ceased, by dismissing the bill. What 
is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause 
in a particular way? In the case before us, the Court of 
Claims has rendered judgment for the claimant and an 
appeal has been taken to this court. We are directed 
to dismiss the appeal, if we find that the judgment~ 
be affirmed, because of a pardon granted to the interstate v 
of the claimants. Can we do so without allowing one 
party to the controversy to decide it in its own fav-or? 
Can we do so without allowing that the legislature may 
prescribe rules of decision to the J udicia.I Department of 
the government in cases pending before it? 
" 
" ... Can [Congress] prescribe a rule in conformity 
with which the court must deny to itself the jurisdiction 
thus conferred, because and only because its decision, in 
accordance with settled law, must be adverse to the gov-
ernment and favorable to the suitor? This question 
seems to us to answer itself." !d., at 146-147. 
Second, the rule prescribed by the proviso "is also liable 
to just exception as impairing the effect of a pardon, a,nd thus 
infringing the constitutional power of the Executive." I d., 
at 147. The Court held that it would not serve as an instru-
ment toward the legislative end of changing the effect of a 
presidential pardon. ld., at 148. 
It was, of course, the former constitutional objection held 
applicable to the legislative proviso in K7ein that the Court 
was concerned about in Pope. But that objection is not ap-
plicable to the case before us for two reasons. First, of 
obvious importance to the Klein holding was the fact that 
Congress was attempting to decide the controversy at issue 
in the Government's own favor. Thus, Congress' action 
could not be grounded upon its broad power to recognize and 
pay the Nation's debts. Second, and even more important, 
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rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way [.]" 13 
Wall., at 146. The amendment at issue in the present case, 
however. ]ike the Special Act at issue in Cherokee Nation, 
waived the defense of res judicata so that a legal claim could 
be resolved on the merits. Congress made no effort in either 
instance to control the Court of Claims' ultimate decision of 
that claim. See n. 23, supra.2" 
25 Before completing our analysis of this Court's precedents in this 
area, we turn to the question whether the holdings in Cherokee Nation, 
Nock. and Pope, might have been bast>d on views, once held by this Court, 
ihnt the Court of Clnims was not, in all re~Jll'ct:;, an Art. III court, and 
that rlaimR again;;t the United State;; were not within Art. III's exten-
sion of "judicial Power" "to Controver~it>s to which the United States 
shall be a Party." U. S. Com:t ., Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See Williams v. 
United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). 
Pope it;;elf would ~eem to disp~·l any such conclusion. See 323 U. S., 
at 12-14. Moreover, Mr. Justice Harlan's plurality opinion announcing 
the judgment of the Court in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530 
(1962), la~·s that que:;tion to rest. In Glidden, tht> plurality observed 
that "it is probably true that Congress devotes a more lively attention 
to the work performed by the Court of Claims, and that it has been more 
prone to modify the jurisdiction assigned to that court." !d., at 566. 
But they concluded that that circumstance did not render the decisions of 
the Court of Claims legislative in character, nor, impliedly, did those 
instances of "lively attention" constitute impermissible interference with 
the Court of Claims' judicial functions. 
"Throughout its history the Court of Claims has frequently been given 
juri:-;diPtion by ~JWcial act to award recovery for breach of what would 
have bern, on the part of an individual, a.t most a moral obligation . ... 
Congi'ess has waived the benefit of res judicata, Cherokee Nation v. 
United States, 270 U. S. 476, 486, and of defenses based on the passage 
of time ...• 
"In doing so, as this Court has uniformly held, Congress has enlisted 
the aid of judicial power whose exercise is amenable to appellate review 
here. . . . Indeed the Court has held that Congress may for reasons 
adequate to itself confer bounti-es upon persons and, by consenting to suit, 
convPrt their moral claim into a legal one enforceable by litigation in an 
undoubted constitutional court. United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 
427. 
"The issue was settled beyond peradventure in Pope v. United States, 
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When Congress enacted the amendment directing the Court 
of Claims to review the merits of the Black Hills claim, it 
neither brought into question the finality of that court's 
earlier judgments, nor interfered with that Court's judicial 
function in deciding the merits of the claim. When the Sioux 
returned to the Court of Claims following passage of the 
amendment, they were there in pursuit of judicial enforce-
ment of a new legal right. Congress had not "reversed" the 
Court of Claims' holding that the claim was barred by res 
judicata, nor, for that matter, had it reviewed the 1942 deci-
sion rejecting the Sioux' claim on the merits. As Congress 
explicitly recognized, it only was providing a forum so that 
a new judicial review of the Black Hills claim could take 
place. This review was to be based on the facts found by 
the Court of Claims after reviewing all the evidence, and an 
application of generally controlling lega.J principles to those 
facts. For these reasons, Congress was not reviewing the· 
merits of the Court of Claims' decisions, and did not interfere 
with the finality of its judgments. 
323 U. S. 1. There the Court held that for Congress to direct the Court 
of Claims to entertain a claim theretofore barred for any legal reason from 
recovery-as, for instance, by the statute of limitations, or because the 
contract had been drafted to rxclude such claims-was to invoke the use 
of judicial power, notwitbstanding that the task might involve no more· 
than computation of the sum due. . . . After this decision it cannot be 
douuled that when Congress transmutes a moral obligation into a legal 
one by specially consenting to suit, it authorizes the tribunal that hears 
the case to perform a judicial function." 370 U. S., at 566-567 ( cita-
tions omitted). 
The Court in Glidden held that, at least. since 1953, the Court of 
Claims has been an Art. III court. See id .. at 585-589 (concurring 
opinion). In his opinion concurring in the result, Mr. Just ice Clark did 
not take iHsue with the plurality's view that suits against thr Unitrd States 
are "Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party," within· 
the meaning of Art. III . Compare 370 U. S., at '562-565 (plurality opin-
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Moreover, Congress in no way attempted to prescribe the 
outcome of the Court of Claims' new review of the merits. 
That court was left completely free to reaffirm its 1942 judg-
ment that the Black Hil1s claim was not cognizable under the 
Fifth Amendment, if upon its review of the facts and law, 
such a decision was warranted. In this respect, the amend-
ment before us is a far cry from the legislatively enacted 
"consent judgment" milled into question in Pope, yet found 
constitutional as a valid exercise of Congress' broad power 
to pay the Nation 's debts. And, for the same reasons, this 
amendment clearly is distinguishable from the proviso to this 
Court's appellate jurisdiction ·held unconstitutional in Klein. 
In sum, as this Court implicitly held in Cherokee Nation, 
Congress' mere waiver of the res judicata effect of a prior 
judicial de~eject11i:g t1le vahaity of a legal claim against 




In reaching its conclusion that the 1877 Act effected a tak-
ing of the Black Hills for which just compensation was due 
the Sioux under the Fifth Amendment, the Court of Claims 
relied upon the "good faith effort" test developed in its earlier 
decision in 1'hree Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. 
United States, 182 Ct. Cl. 543, 390 F . 2d 686 (1968). The 
Fort Berthold test had been designed to reconcile two lines 
of cases decided by this Court that seemingly were in con-
flict. The first line, exemplified by Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 
187 U. S. 553 (1903), recognizes "that Congress possesse[sJ 
a paramount power over the property of the Indians, by rea-
son of its exercise of guardianship over their interests, and 
that such authority might be implied, even though opposed 
to the strict letter of a treaty with the Indians." I d., at 565. 
The second line, exemplified by the more recent decision in 
Shoshone :l'ribe v. United States, 299 U. S. 476 (1937), con~ 
.. 
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cedes Congress' paramount power over Indian property, but 
holds, nonetheless, that 11 [ t] he power does not extend so far 
as to enable the Government 'to give the tribal lands to 
others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes, without 
rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just compen-
sation.'" Id., at 497 (quoting United States v. Creek Nation, 
295 U. S. 103, 110 (1935) ). In Shoshone Tribe, Mr. Justice 
Cardozo, in speaking for the Court, expressed the distinction 
between the conflicting principles in a characteristically pithy 
phrase: 11Spoliation is not management." 299 U. S., at 498. 
The Fort Berthold test distinguishes between cases in which 
one or the other principle is applicable: 
''It is obvious that Congress cannot simultaneonsly 
(1) act as trustee ·for tht:> benefit of the Indians, exer-
cising its plenary powers over the Indians aud their 
lJroperty, as it thin"ks is in their best interests, and 
(2) exercise its sovereign power of eminent domain, tak-
ing the Indians' property within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution. In any given situation 
in which Congress has acted with regard to Indian peo-
ple, it must have acted either in one capacity or the 
other. Congress can own two bats, but it cannot wear 
them both at the same time. 
11Some guideline must be established so that a court 
can identify in which capacity Congress is acting. The 
followiug guideline would best give recognition to the 
basic distinction between the two types of congressional 
actio11: Where Congress makes a good faith effort to give 
the Indians the full value of the land and thus merely 
transmutes the property from land to money, there is no 
taking. This is a mere substitution of assets or change 
of form and is a traditional function of a trustee." 182. 
Ct. Cl. , at 553, 390 F. 2d, at 691. 
Applying the Fort Berthold test to the facts of this case, 
the ·court of Claims concluded that, in passing the 1877 Act ... 
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Congress had not made a, good-faith effort to give the Sioux 
the full value of the Black Hills. The rincipal issue pre-
sented by this case is whether the legal stan ar applied by 
the Court of Claims was erroneous. 26 
B 
The Government contends that the Court of Claims erred 
insofar as its holding that the 1877 Act effected a taking of 
the Black Hills was based on Congress' failure to indicate 
affirmatively that the co11sideration given the Sioux was of 
equivalent value to the property rights ceded to the Govern-
ment. It argues that "the true rule is that Congress must 
be assumed to be acting within its plenary power to manage 
tribal assets if it reasonably can be conCluded that the legis-
lation was intended to promote the welfare of the tribe~" 
Brief for United States 52. The Government derives sup-
port for this rule principally from this Court's decision in 
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock. 
In Lone Wolf, representatives of the Kiowa, Comanche, 
and Apache tribes brought an equitable action against the 
Secretary of the Interior and other governmental officials to 
enjoin them from enforcing the terms of an act of Congress 
20 It should be recognized at the outset that the inquiry presented by 
this case is different from that confronted in the more typical of our 
recent " taking" decisions. E . g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, - U. S. 
- (1979) ; Penn Central Transp . Co . v. N ew York, 438 U. S. 104 (1978) . 
In those ca8es the Court has sought to "detcrmin[e] when 'justice ~ 
and fairness' require that, economic injuries caused by public action be 
compensa.trd by the government, rather than remain disproportionately 
concrntrated on a few persons.' ' Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 124. Here, 
there is no doubt that the Black Hills were "taken" from the Sioux in a 
way that wholly dei)rivcd them of their property rights to that land. The 
question prrRented is whrthcr Congre<:s was acting under circumstances in 
whirh that " taking" implied an obligation to pay just compensntion, or 
whether it wns acting pursuant to its unique powers to mannge and COJh 
trol triba l property us the gunrdian of Indian welfare, in which event the 
Just Compensation Clause would not apply. 
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that called for the sale of lands held by the Indians pursuant 
to the Medicine Lodge Treaty of 1867, 15 Stat. 581. That 
treaty, like the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, included a pro-
vision that any future cession of reservation lands would be 
without validity or force "unless executed and signed by at 
least three fourths of all the adult male Indians occupying 
the same." !d., at 58~. The legislation at issue, Act of 
June 6, 1900, 31 Stat. 672, was based on an agreement with 
the Indians that had not been signed by the requisite number 
of adult males residing on the reservation. 
This Court's principal holding in Lone Wolf was that "the 
legislative power might pass laws in conflict with treaties 
made with the Indians." 187 U. S., at 566. The Court 
stated: 
"The power exists to abrogate the provisions of an 
Indian treaty, though presumably such power will be 
exercised only when circumstances arise which will not 
only justify the government in disregarding the stipula-
tions of the treaty, but may ·demand, in the interest of 
the country and the Indians themselves, that it should 
do so. When, therefore, treaties were entered into be-
tween the United States and a tribe of Indians it was 
never doubted that the power to abrogate existed in Con-
gress, and that in a contingency such power might be 
availed of from considerations of governmental policy, 
particularly if consistent with perfect good faith towards 
the Indians." Ibid. (Emphasis in original.) 27 
The Court. therefore, was not required to consider the con-
tentions of the Indians that the agreement ceding their lands 
2 7 This a~pect of the Lone Wolf holding, often rea ffirmed, see, e. g., 
Rosebud SiO'ux Tribe v. Kn eip, 430 U. S. 584, 594 (1977) , is not at issue 
in this case . The Sioux do not claim that C0ngress was without power 
to take the Black Hills from them in contravention of t.he Fort Laramie 
Treaty of 1868. They claim only that Congress could not do so incon-
sistently with the command of the Fifth Amendment: "nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compemsation.'1 
' I 
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had been obtained by fraud, and had not been signed by the 
requisite number of adult males. "[A]ll these matters, in 
any event. were solely within the domain of the legislative 
authority and its action is conclusive upon the courts." !d., 
at 568. 
. \.~he penultimate paragraph of the opinion, however, the 
1" r Court_]J-one Wolf went on to ma.ke some observations seem~ 
ingly directed to the question whether the act at issue might 
constitute a ta.king of Indian property without just compen~ 
sation. The Court there stated: 
"The act of June 6, 1900, which is complained of in 
the bill, was enacted at a time when the tribal relations 
between the confederated tribe~ of Kiowas, Comanches 
and Apaches still existed, and that statute and the stat~ 
utes supplementary thereto dealt with the disposition of 
tribal property and purported to give an adequate con-
sideration for the surplus lands not allotted among the 
Indians or reserved for their benefit. Indeed, the con-
troversy which this case presents is concluded by the 
decision in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294, 
decided at this term, where it was held that full admin-
istrative power was possessed by Congress over Indian 
tribal property. In effect, the action of Congress now 
complained of was but an exercise of such power, a mere 
change in the form of investment of Indian tribal prop-
erty, the property of those who, as we have held, were 
in substantial effect the wards of the government. We 
must presume that Congress acted i·n perfect good faith 
in the dealings with the Indians of which complaint is 
made, and that the legislative branch of the government 
exercised its best judgment in the premises. In any 
event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter, 
the judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives 
which prompted the enactment of this legislation. If 
injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be under~ 
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stood a implying, by the use made by Congress of 
its power, relief must be sought by an appeal to that 
body for redress and uot to the courts. The legisla-
tion in question was constitutional." Ibid. (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
The Government relics on the italicized sentence in the 
quotation above to suport its view "that Congress must be 
assumed to be acting within its plenary power to manage 
tribal assets if it reasonably can be concluded that the legis-
lation was intended to promote the welfare of the tribe." 
Several adjoining passages in the paragraph, however, lead 
us to doubt whether the Lone Wolf Court meant to state a 
general rule applicable to cases such as the one before us. 
First, L(Yrle Wolf presented a situation in which Congress 
"purported to give an adequate consideration" f~r . 0--cJt 
lands taken from the Indians. In fact, the ~issue set ..._ 
aside for the Indians a sum certain of $2 million for surplus 
reservation lands surrendereu to the United States. 31 Stat. 
678; see 187 U. S., at 555. In contrast, the background of 
the 1877 Act "reveals a situation where Congress did not 
'purport' to provide 'adequate consideration,' nor was there 
any meaningful negotiation or arm's-length bargaining, nor 
did Congress consider it was paying a fair price." 220 Ct. 
Cl., at -, 601 F. 2d, at 1176 (concurring opinion). 
Second, given the provisions of the act at issue in Lone 
Wolf, the Court reasonably was able to conclude that "the 
action of Congress now complained of was but .... a mere 
change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property." 
Under the Act of June 6, 1900, each head of a family was to 
be allotted a tract of land within the reservation of not less 
than 320 acres, an additional 480,000 acres of grazing land 
were set aside for the use of the tribes in common, and $2 
million was paid to the Indians for the remaining surplus. 
31 Stat. 677- 678. In contrast, the historical background ta 
the opBu'ing of .the Biack Hiils for settiement, and the t~rir);$: 
.. 
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or th€' 1877 Act itself, see Part I, supra, would not lead one 
to conclude that the Act effected "a mere change in the form 
of .i11Vestment of Indian tribal property." 
Third, it seems significant that the views of the Court in 
Lone Wolf were based, in part, on a holding that "Congress 
possessed full power in the matter." Earlier in the opinion 
the Court stated: "Plenary authority over the tribal relations 
of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the be-
ginning, and the power has always been deemed a political 
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department 
of the government." 187 U. S .. at 565. Thus, it seems that 
the Court's conclusive presumption of congressional good 
faith was based in large measure on the idea that relations 
between this Nation and the Indian tribes are a political mat-
ter, not amenable to judicial review. That view, of course, 
has long since been discredited in takings cases, and was ex-
pressly laid to rest in Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. 
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977).28 
28 For thi;; rea, on, the Government does not here press Lone Wolf to 
its logical limits, arguing instead !hat its "strict rule" that the manage-
ml'nt and disposal of tribal lands is a political question, "has been relaxed 
in recent years to allow review under thr Fifth Amendment rational-
basis test ." Brief for United Statrs 55, n. 46. The Government relies 
on Delaware 1'ribal Business Cornm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1977), 
and Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 555 (1974), as establishing a, 
rational-basi ~-; ll'st for determining whether Congress, in a given instance, 
confiscated Indian property or engaged merely in its power to manage 
and rlisposf' of i ribal lands in the Indians' best interests. But those cases, 
which l'Slablish a standard of review for judgiug the constitutionality of 
Indian legislation under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
do not provide an api analogy for resolution of the issuE' presrnted here-
whelhl'r Congress' disposition of tribal properly was an exNcisc of its 
power of rminent domain or iis power of guardianship. As noted earlier, 
supm, at n. 27, the Sioux concpdp the constitutionality of Congre~:;s' unilat-
eral abrogation of the Fort LaramiP Treaty. They Hl'Pk only a holding 
that ihe Black Hill::; "werP appropriated by thl' United StateF< in circum-
Rtrmces which involvPd an implied undertakmg by it to make just com-
llCP.:Sation to the lribc." United States. v. Creek Nation, 295 U. 8 ', 1:03', 
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to the objective facts as revealed by Acts of Congre~s, 
congressional committee reports, statements submitted to 
Congress by government officials, reports of special com-
missions appointed by Congress to treat with the Indians, 
and similar evidence relating to the acquisition .... 
"The 'good faith effort' and 'transmutatio11 of prop-
erty' concepts referred to in Fort Berthold are opposite 
sides of the same coi11. They reflect the traditional rule 
that a trustee may change the form of trust assets as 
long as he fairly (or in good faith) attempts to provide 
his ward with property of equivalent value. If he does 
that, he cannot be faulted if hindsight should demon-
strate a lack of precise equivalence. On the other hanrl. 
if a trustee (or the government in its dealings with the 
Indians) does not attempt to give the ward the fair 
equivalent of what he acquires from him, the trustee to 
that extent has taken rather than transmuted the prop-
erty of the ward. In other words, an essential clement 
of the inquiry under the Fort Berthold guideline is deter .. 
mining the adequacy of the consideration the govern-
ment gave for the Indian lands it acquired. That in-
quiry cannot be avoided by the government's simple 
assertion that it acted in good faith in its dealings with 
the Indians." 220 Ct. Cl., at -, 601 F. 2d, at 1162.30 
30 An examination of this ~tandard reveals that, contrary to the Govern-
ment '::; as::;ertion, the Court of Claims in thi::; case did not ba::;e its finding 
of u taking solely ou Cougre::;o1 fai]ure in 1877 to ::;tate affirmatively that 
the ''a::;set::;" givrn the Sioux in exchange for fhe Black Hills were equiva-
leut in valuP to the land surrendered. Rafher, the court left open the 
pos..~ibility that, in an approJ>riate case, a mPrP as::mtion of congressional 
good faith in ·etting the terms of a forced surrender of treaty-protected 
land::; could be overcome by objective indicia to the contrary. And, in 
like 'fa::;hion, there may be instance::; in which the consideration provided 
the Indian~ for surrendered treaty lands wa;; so patently adequate and fair 
that Congres;;' failure to state the obvious would not result in the finding 
of a. compen::;able taking. 
To the extent thtLt lhe Coqrt of Claim;;' l:l tandard, in this respect 1 
., 
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D 
We next examine the factual findings made by the Court 
of Claims, which led it to the conclusion that the 1877 Act 
effected a taking. First, the Court found that "[tjhe only 
item of 'consideration' that possibly could be viewed as show-
ing an attempt by Congress to give the Sioux the 'full value' 
of the land the government took from them was the require-
ment to furnish them with rations until they became self-
sufficient." 220 Ct. Cl., at -, 601 F. 2d, at 1166. This 
finding is fully supported by the record, and the Government 
does not seriously contend otherwise.31 
departed from the original formulation of the Fott Berthold test, see 220 
Ct. Cl., at -, 601 F. 2d, at 1182-1183 (dissenting opinion), such a 
departure was wurnmtei.l. The Court of Claims' pre8ent formulation of 
the te><t , which takes into account tlw adequacy of the consideration given, 
does little more than reaffirm the ancient principle that the determination 
of the mea:sure of just compensation for a taking of private property "is 
a judirial and not a legislative question." Monongahela Navigation Co. v. 
United States. 148 U.S. 312, 327 (1893). 
31 The 1877 Act, see supra, at -, and n. 14, JlUrported to provide the 
Sioux with "all necel:lsary aid to assist the said Indians in the work of 
civilization ," and "to furnish to them schools and instruction in mt>chani-
eal and agrinultural arts, as provided for by the treaty of 1868." 19 Stat. 
256. The Court of Claims correctly concluded that the fir:st item "was so 
vague that it cannot be cons;dered us constituting a meaningful or signifi-
cant elrment. of paymPnt by thr United States." 220 Ct. Cl., at -, 601 
F. 2d, ut 1166. As for the :second, it "ga,ve the Sioux nothing to which 
tht>Y were not already entitled [undrr the 1868 treHtyJ." /d., Ht -, 601 
F. 2d, at 1166. 
The Government has placed ::>orne reliance in this Court on the fact thHt 
the 1877 Act ext(•nded the northern boundHries of the re:servation bv add-
irg some 900,000 acre::> of grazing land::>. See n. 14, supra. In the Court 
of C1aim:s, howrver, the Governmrnt did "not contend ... that the tranofer 
of thi:s additional land was a significant p)emen1 of the con::>ideration the 
Unitrd Statr::> gave for the Black Hills." 220 Ct. Cl., at-, n. 3, 601 F. 
2d, at 1163. n . 3. And Congre:s::> obviously did uot intend the exteno;ion of 
thr re::>ervation '~ northern bordnr to constitute con:siderHtion for the prop-
er!~· right:,; surrendpred by thE' Sioux. The extpn:;icn wa:s effected in thHt 
!lrtl r le of the Act redefining the re:;ervation':s bord<>r::> ; it wns not men· 
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SecoiHl, the court found, after engaging in an exhaustive 
review of the historical record, that neither the Mauypenny 
Cornmissiou, nor the cougressional committees that approved 
the 1877 Act, nor the individual legislators who spoke on its 
behalf ou the floor of Congress, ever indicated a belief that 
the Government's obligation to provide the Sioux with rations 
constituted a fair equivalent for the value of the Black Hills 
and the additional property rights the Indians were forced to 
surrender. See id., at ---, 601 F. 2d, at 1166-1168. 
This finding is unchallenged by the Government. 
1\. third fiuding lending some weight to the Court's legal 
couclusion was that the conditions placed by the Govern-
ment on the Sioux' entitlement to rations, see n. 14, supra, 
"further show that the government's undertaking to furnish 
rations to the Indians uutil they could support themselves did 
not reflect a congressional decision that the value of the 
rations was the equivaleut of the land the Indians were giving 
up, but instead was an attempt to coerce the Sioux into 
capitulating to congressional demands." !d., at -, 601 F. 
2d, at 1168. We might add only that this finding is fully 
eonsistent with similar observations made by this Court 
nearly a century ago in an analogous case. 
In Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 35 (1886), 
tioned in the article which stated 1ht> consideration given for the Sioux' 
" ct>R.Sion of !t>rritory and right:-;." Sec 19 Stat. 255-256. l\Ioreover, our 
characterizing thP 900,000 acres a.s a::;:-;ets givt>n the Sioux in con:sidt>ration 
for tlw propt>rty right~ they cc•dpu would not lead u::; to conclude that the 
term:, of the CX('hange were "so palt>ntly adequate and fair" that a com-
Jll'n::;abh' taking ::;hould not hnw been found . St>e n. 30, S'Upra. 
Final!~ · , wP noll:' that tht> Government does not claim that tht> Indian 
Claim:; Commi,::;ion and thr Court of Claim:; incorrectly valurd the prop-
er!~· right~ takPn by thr 1877 Act by failing to consider the exten~ion of 
thr nort hPrn bordPr. Rather, the Govrrmnrnt argues only that the 900,000 
acrt'~ ::;hould be con:sidrrt>d, along with tlw obligation to provide rations, 
in <lPtrrminiug whellwr the Act, vi('Wf'd in its Pntirrty, con::;titutt'd a good-
faith effort on the part of Congrt>HS to prornotP the Sioux' welfare. See 
BriPf ror United State::; 7:3, amlu. 5 . 
' I 
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the Court held, over objections by the Government, that an 
award made by the Senate on an Indian tribe's treaty claim 
"was fair, just. and equitable." The treaty at issue had 
called for the removal of the Choctaw Nation from treaty-
protected lands in exchange for payments for the tribe's sub-
sistence for one year. payments for cattle and improvements 
on the new reservation, an annuity of $20,000 for 20 years 
commencing upon removal, and the provision of educational 
and agricultural services. I d., at 38. TI!is Court stated: 
"It is notorious as a historical fact, as it abundantly 
appears from the record in this case, that great pressure 
had to be brought to bear upon the Indians to eft'ect 
their removal, and the whole treaty was evidently and 
purposely executed, not so much to secure to the Indians 
the rights for which they had stipulated, as to eft'ectuate 
the policy of the United States in regard to their removal. 
The most noticeable thing, upon a careful consideration 
of the terms of this treaty, is, that no money considera-
tion is promised or paid for a cession of lands, the bene-
ficial ownership of which is assumed to reside in the 
Choctaw Nation, and computed to amount to over ten 
millions of acres." I d., at 37-38. 
As for the payments that had been made to the Indians in 
order to induce them to remove themselves from their treaty 
lands, the Court, in words we find applicable to the 1877 Act, 
concluded: 
"It is nowhere expressed in the treaty that these pay-
ments are to be made as the price of the lands ceded; 
and they are all only such expenditures as the govern-
ment of the United States could well afford to incur for 
the mere purpose of executing its policy in reference to 
the removal of the Indians to their new homes. As a 
consideration for the value of the lo:nds ceded by the 
treaty, they rnust be regarded as a rneagre pittance:') 




48 lT~lTED STATES v. SIOUX NATION OF INDIANS 
These couclusions. in light of the historical backgTound to 
the opening of the Black Hills for settlement, see Part I, 
S'Upra, seem fully applicable to Congress' decision to remove 
the Sioux from that valuable tract of land, aud to extinguish 
their off-reservation hunting rights. 
Finally, the Court of Claims rejected the Government's 
conteution that the fact that it subsequently haJ spent at 
least $43 million on rations for the Sioux (over the course of 
three quarters of a century) established that the 1877 Act 
was au act of guardianship taken in the Sioux' best interest. 
The court concluded : "The critical inquiry is what CongTess 
did- and how it viewed the obligation it was assuming-at 
the time it acquired the land, and not how much it ultimately 
cost the ·united States to fulfill the obligation." 220 Ct. Cl., 
at - . 601 F. 2d, at 1168. It found no basis for believing 
that Congress, in 1877, anticipated that it would take the 
Rioux such a lengthy period of time to become self-sufficient, 
or that the fulfillment of the Government's obligation to feed 
the Sioux would entail the large expenditures ultimately 
made on their behalf. Ibid. We find no basis on which to 
question the legal standard applied by the Court of Claims, 
or the findiugs it reached, conceming Congress' decision to 
provide the Sioux with rations. 
E 
The aforemeu tioned findings fully support the Court of 
Claims' couclusion that the 1877 Act appropriated the Black 
Hills "in circumstances which involved an implied under-
taking by [the United Statesl to make just compensation to 
the tribe." United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U. S., at 111. 
We make only two additional observations about this case. 
First, dating at lea st from the decision in Cherokee Nation v. 
Kansas Railway Co. , 135 U.S. 641 , 657 (1890), this Court has 
recognized that Indian lands, to which a tribe holds recog-
nized title, "are held subject .to the authority of the general 
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government to lake them for such objects as are germane to 
the execution of the powers granted to it; provided only, that 
they are not taken without just compensation being made to 
the owner." In the same decision the Court emphasized that 
the owner of such lands 11is en titled to reasonable, certain and 
adequate provision for obtainiug compensation before his oc-
cupancy is disturbed." Id. , at 659. The Court of Claims 
gave effect to this principle when it held that the Govern-
ment's uncertain and indefinite obligation to provide the 
Sioux with rations until they become self-sufficient did not 
constitute adequate consideration for the Black Hills. 
Second, it seems readily apparent to us that the obligation 
to provide rations to the Sioux was undertaken in order to 
ensure them a means of surviving their transition from the 
uomadic life of the hunt to the agrarian lifestyle Congress 
had chosen for them. Those who have studied the Govern-
ment's reservatiou policy during this period of our Nation's 
history agree. See n. 11 , supra. It is important to recognize 
that the 1877 Act, in additiou to removing the Black Hills 
from the Great Sioux Reservation , also ceded the Sioux' 
huntiug rights in a vast tract of land extending beyoud the 
boundaries of that reservatiou. See 11. 14, supra. Under 
such circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress' 
undertaking of an obligation to provide rations for the Sioux 
was a quid pro quo for deprivin them of their chosen way 
of lfe, an was not mtended to compensate t em for the 
taking of the Black Hills . 3~ 
3" We find furthPr support for fbi~ conclu::~ion in Congre::;s' 1974 amend-
ment to § 2 of thf' Indian Claim~< Commission Act, 25 U. S. C. § 70a. 
SPP n. 17, supra. That armndment provided that in det ermining offsets, 
"expenditures for food, rations , or provisions shall not be deemed payments 
on f hr claim." Th r rrport- of thf' Senate CommittrP on Interior and 
Insula r Affa irs, whi<"h accompanied thio; ammdment , made two points that 
aro pprf inPut. here. First, it notPd tha t " [a J !though rouchPd in general 
1Prms, this amPndment is dirrrt ed to one basic objec tive-expediting the 
Indian Cla ims Commi~~ion 'i:i di,position of the fa mou,.~ Black Hill~ Calle .... 
•. 
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In sum, we conclude that the legal analysis and factual 
findings of the Court of Claims fully support its conclusion 
that the terms of the 1877 Act did not effect "a mere change 
in the form of investment of Indian tribal property." Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S., at 568. Rather, the 1877 Act 
effected a taking of tribal property, property which had been 
set aside for the exclusive occupation of the Sioux by the Fort 
Laramie Treaty of 1868. That taking implied an obligation 
on the part of the Government to make just compensation to 
the Sioux Nation, and that obligation, including an award of 
·interest, must now, at last, be paid. 
The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed. 
It i$ so ordered. 
S. Rep. No. 9:3-863, p. 2 (1974) (incorporating memorandum prepared 
by the Sioux Tribe;;) . Second, the Committee obsrrved: 
"The farts are, as the Commis::;ion found, that the United States dis-
armed the Sioux and denird them their traditional hunting areas in an 
effort to forcr the ::;ale of the Black Hill:>. Having violated the 1868 Treaty 
and having reduced the Indians to starvation, thr United States should 
not now bP in the po~:>ition of saying that the rations it furni::;hed consti-
tuted payment for the land which it took. In short, the Government com-
mitted two wrongs : first, it deprived the Sioux of tht>ir livt>lihood; secondly, 
it dt>privt>d thp Sioux of their land . What the United States gave back in 
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.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.;§u:pl•mtt <4tturl ttf iflt 'J!fuittb ~taUS' 
'Jlagfringhm. ~. (!}. 2!lgt~~ 
June 16, 1980 
Re: 79-639 - United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians 
Dear Harry, 
Regretfully, for the reasons I shall state, I am reluc-
tant to join all of your opinion. In the first place, I have 
found the case a much closer one on the merits than your 
opinion makes it out to be. Also, the validity of the Indian 
Claims Commission finding that the government acted unfairly 
and dishonorably is not before us, and I do not entirely 
share the atmosphere of your draft that mten casts the con-
duct of the government in such an unfavorable light. I would 
also prefer in stating the historical facts to stand on the 
record rather than to rely on accounts by historians and 
other writers whose accuracy and objectivity have not been 
put to the test. 
I agree with your Part III and with the general conclusion 
stated in: Part V that when judged by currently prevailing Fifth 
Amendment standards, the Court of Claims was correct in conclud-
ing that the government actions at issue here effected a taking 
for which compensation was and is due. 
I shall file a statement to this effect. 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 

















TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: David 
DATE: June 20, 1980 
RE: No. 79-639, United States v. Sioux Nation 
Mr. Just ice Rehnquist' s opinion strikes several appeal inq 
notes, but I believe in the end it is unpersuasive. The araument on 
the merits seems to me plainly to favor the Indians. The Article III 
question, however, is closer. Justice Rehnauist does not acknowledge 
the full force of the opinion in Cherokee Nation v. United · states, 
which held: 
"The question of interest [on a prior award] was 
considered and decided, and it is quite clear that but for 
the special Act of 1919, above quoted, the ouest ion here 
mooted would have been foreclosed as res iudicata. In 
pass ina the Act, Congress must have been well advised of 
this, and the only possible construction therefore to be put 
upon it is that Conaress has therein expressed its desire, 
so far as the question of interest is concerned, to waive 
the effect of the judgment as res · judicata. • • The power 
of Congress to waive such an adjudication is clear." 270 
u.s., at 486. 
I believe that this passage squarely controls the issue in this case, 
unless you are of a mind to repudiate it. Justice Rehnquist's 
attempted distinction of the precedent, pp. 9-10, seems somewhat 
lame. 
As we discussed, the historical garment-rending indulqed in 
by the Court opinion is not necessary to the case. 
forecefully makes this point in his final section. 
Justice Rehnquist's equally subjective retort on 
course might be to join with Justice White in 
substantive holdings in the case (Parts III 
implication reject the historical passaoes. 
2. 
Justice Rehnquist 
Rather than join 
this, the best 
joining only the 














THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
j;u.pumt Ofcnri nf tqt~b .ihdts 
~uqmghrn. ~. OJ. 2ll.?Jl.~ 
June 23, 1980 




Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
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